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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
November 25 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 81-430 CSY 
Illinois 
v. 
Gates, et ux. 
Cert to Ill S Ct {Ward for the 
court; Moran [diss] with 
Underwood) 
State/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: The state contends that a letter from an 
anpnymous informer, together with corroborating circumstances, 
was sufficient probable cause under Aguilar for issuang€ of a 
search warrant. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: Police in Bloomingdale, 
Illinois, received an anonymous letter regarding the resps. It 
{b_ dlh~'V ~ ~ ~.) ~-::I_~ ~ &-wu- v-tuz_ ~ 
~· 7lz (f{l-VArfu~ U I b'rfu~ 4 ~//uc;! 
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listed their address and stated that they made their living 
selling drugs. Further, the letter described their method of 
operation. According to the letter, resp Sue would drive resps' 
car to Florida where it would be loaded with drugs. Resp Lance 
would fly to Florida and drive the car back. Then Sue would 
return by plane. Moreover, the letter warned that Sue would 
drive to Florida on May 3 as part of another drug transaction. 
And, the letter told the police that resps had over $100,000 in 
drugs in their basement. 
With the help of a confidential informant who provided 
police with access to financial records, the police confirmed 
that the letter gave resps' correct address. Police also 
discovered that L. Gates had a reservation on a May 5 flight to 
Florida. A DEA agent followed Lance, who flew to Florida and 
went to a motel room registered to Sue. The agent saw Lance 
leave with a woman {presumably Sue) in a car with Illinois tags. 
The police found that the tags were registered in Lance's name, 
but for a different car. 
The police then obtained a search warrant from an Illinois 
court to search resps' home and the car they were using in 
Florida. Resps arrived back at their home by car on May 7. The 
po~ice were waiting, searched the trunk of resps' car, and found 
350 lbs of marijuana. In the house were marijuana, weapons, and 
drug paraphernalia. In addition, resps were in posses~ion of 
cocaine. ~ 
Resps were indicted for drug offenses, and Lance was charged 
with possession of an unlicensed firearm. Pretrial, resps moved 
·. 
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to suppress the fruits of the search, contending that the letter 
did not provide probable cause for the warrant. They argued that 
the anonymous letter did not set forth the underlying 
circumstances on which the informer based his report or 
underlying circumstances which would indicate that the letter was 
reliable, as required by Aguilar v. 
They also contended th7 the police 
corroborate the accu~ion that the 
criminal activity. Tfie trial court 
Ill Ct App affirmed. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 {1964). 
investigation did not 
resps were involved in 
agreed with resps, and the 
The Ill S Ct also affirmed. Aguilar has two prongs, a 
"basis of knowledge" prong and a veracity prong. The letter 
fails the first test, because it did not describe how the 
informer knew that resps were involved in the drug trade. The 
informer's report may have been based on hearsay, not the 
informer's personal observation. The letter also fails the 
veracity test, because the police had no idea who the informer 
was. They had no way of knowing whether the informer could be 
trusted or not. And, unlike the informer in United States v. 
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 {1971), this informant made no statement 
against penal interest. 
Furthermore, the corroborating police investigation did not 
cure these deficiencies. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 
41~ {1969). The police determined that the informer g~ve resps' 
-
correct address and that resps' were driving back from~lorida, 
7-
but those details did not establish that the informer's letter 
was based on personal knowledge rather than rumor. Also, the 
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police investigation discovered no criminal activity before the 
search. Thus, the police had no reason to think that this 
anonymous informer wrote from personal knowledge or that he was 
reliable. The investigation was not sufficient to satisfy 
Aguilar. 
The dissent thought that the corroborating investigation, 
combined with the detail of the letter, satisfied Augilar. The 
corroborating information demonstrated that the informer had an 
adequate basis for his knowledge. This case is like Draper v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), in which the police confirmed 
the details of an informer's story to obtain probable cause. The 
corroborating information also showed that the informer was 
probably telling the truth. The police may have discovered only 
innocent activity, but the informer's letter contained many 
details which proved accurate, so that the innocent activity 
became suspicious in light of the letter's accusations. 
CONTENTIONS: The state elaborates on the arguments of the 
dissent. When an informer's tip is sufficiently detailed, it 
will confirm itself. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 425 (White, J., 
concurring). This case is like Draper, in which the informer's 
report was corroborated and the Court found probable cause. It 
is_not like Spinelli, in which the Court found no probable cause 
be~ause the informer provided few details and the police 
investigation supplied only limited corroboration. Sea also 
Whitely v. Warden, 401 u.s. 560 (1971) (informant's tip~an supply 
probable cause together with information gathered by police). In 
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addition, under Draper, innocent activity can help to provide 
probable cause, if it corroborates an informant's story. 
Resps observe that all three Illinois courts determined: (1) 
the anonymous letter did not describe the means by which the 
informer obtained his information; (2) the corroboration of 
innocent detail was insufficient to cure the inadequate "basis of 
knowledge" information in the letter; (3) reliance on Draper is 
misplaced, because that case involved a previously reliable 
informer, one who supplied a greater degree of specificity of 
detail. 
Resps also insist that this is a fact-bound case applying 
the established rules of Aguilar. Furthermore, the case involves 
an anonymous letter, a notoriously unreliable source of 
information. 
DISCUSSION: This case boils down to a factual disputeover 
whether it is more like Spinelli or Draper. Three Illinois 
courts decided that the corroboration in this case did not 
demonstrate that a tip in an anonymous letter provided probable 
cause. Although the tip ultimately proved correct, there was no 
reason to believe that the author of the letter would tell the 
truth, and the police investigation revealed no criminal 
activity. The Illinois S Ct might have reasonably found probable 
ca~se, based on the corroboration of several details in the 
letter. But its decision is not clearly in error, and~this case 
is fact-bound. 
I recommend denial. 
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There is a response. 
November 5, 1981 Holleman Opn in petn 
I 
' 
February 26, 1982 Conference 




GATES, et ux. 
I 
Motion of Petition for Leave to 




Although it was not raised_ln the courts below, petr moves to . ........ "----
amend or enlarge the question presented in its petn for cert to the Ill. S.Ct., 
--------------------------------------~------------~--· granted on January 11, 1982, to include the issue of the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionar~ . 
......,.--- ---
I~~: Acting on a letter from an anonymous informant concerning drug 
dealings by the resps, the police confirmed some of the facts alleged in the 
letter, consulted with an assistant state's attorney who wrote the complaint, 
and then obtained a search warrant from an associate judge. The trial court 
agreed with resps that the anonymous letter and the police investigation 




filed in August 1981 and on January 11, 1982, the Court granted cert on the 
following question: 
Whether detailed information provided to police 
by an anonymous informer, coupled with government 
corroboration of the information, provide probable 
cause for the issuance of a search warrant? 
~~IQN~: Petr states that subsequent to the hearing of this case in 
the Ill. courts, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has 
received serious attention by appellate courts. Citing, igt_§f_ $li~. QQ~t~ll9c 
v. Unit-~~. 365 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1961) and ~~er-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. 
Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 319-21 (1971), the petr argues that 
this Court has considered issues not raised below where there has been a 
change in the law or where a ·~asic unfairness might escape review ... " 
(Motion at 3). Petr also notes that in Taylor v. Alabama, No. 81-5152, cert 
granted on November 3, 1981, (Dunaway issue) the State of Alabama and amicus 
have raised the good faith exception in their briefs. The record in this 
case, claims the pet~ establishes that the police acted in good faith in 
obtaining the warrant. Thus, the Question Presented should be enlarged or 
amended to include the following: 
Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to 
obtain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), should the evidence 
obtained under the warrant nevertheless be admitted 
at trial because the police acted in a reasonable 
good faith belief in the validity of the warrant? 
DISCUSSION: Rule 2l.l(a) of this Court's Rules states in part that: 
The statement of a question presented will be 
deemed to comprise every subsidiary question 
fairly included therein. Only the questions set 
forth in the petition or fairly included therein 
will be considered by the Court. 
Embodied in this rule is the proposition that this Court will generally not 
review issues not raised below or in the petition. See generally, Stern and 
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Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 456-465 (1978). Exceptions to the rule 
exist, as noted by petr, supra. But petr's arguments for now amending the 
question to include a matter not raised below or in the cert petn are Hot 
persuasive. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not a 
I 
late-breaking development;l petr could have at least raised the issue in its 
cert petn in August 1981 rather than waiting until the eleventh hour to move 
for an amendment.2 There being no compelling arguments for granting an 
exception to the general rule of limiting plenary review to issues presented 
below, this motion should be denied. 
There is no response. 
2/24/82 Schlueter 
PJC 
1Tbe good faith exception was, according to the petr, given first 
"significant judicial recognition" in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 
846-847 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert den. 101 S.Ct. 946 (1981). Petr is 
apparently discounting recognition of the exception by commentators and 
members of this Court. See~·· Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) 
(White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
2Petr's brief on the merits is due on February 25, 1982. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ILLINOIS v. LANCE GATES ET ux. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 81-430. Decided January-, 1982 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
I dissent for the reason that the Illinois Supreme Court 
clearly misapplies well settled law that a detailed tip from an 
anonymous informant, which is subsequently corroborated 
by the police, presents sufficient probable cause to support a 
search warrant. Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959) .. 
The Bloomingdale, Illinois police department received an 
anonymous letter giving respondents' address and stating 
that they made their living selling drugs. The letter con-
tained a detailed description of respondents method of opera-
tion: that respondent Susan Gates would drive her car to 
Florida where it would be loaded with drugs; that respondent 
Lance Gates would fly to Florida and drive the car back; that 
respondent Susan Gates would then return by airplane. The 
letter stated that a drug transaction would occur on May 3d. 
Finally, the letter stated that respondents had over $100,000 
in drugs in their basement. 
The police confirmed, through a confidential informant, 
that the address in the letter was correct. Respondent 
Lance Gates made a reservation and flew to Florida on May 
5th. He went to a motel room registered to his wife and 
later left in an automobile with tags registered in his name, 
although for another automobile. After observing this de-
tailed corroboration of the anonymous letter, the Blooming-
dale police ootaine<I a warrant to search respondents home 
and the car that they were using in Florida. When respond-
,.\~ p•)ct..- ents arrived back in Illinois by car on ~ay 7th, the police ~ ~. 'v r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ i.-4 o& eft• ~ 
f 1.. /} 'I- V1 Q ... e..-f\7~-o-dzfte.._ __L &aJvt ~vc-~ 5Jr,rj' 
~ ~ J'td-t' ~ 1 - 7 · ~ c~£- \f7u--
C<J-tnk 6.-r<.c~ "'l~ ~ !J~ ~ ~ rvu a--7 ~ fo >Af-' 
• ~~ _/}. r fr n_,?£.., ~(C...J<-~ f 4>_ 
-~  ~ /tL 1 ~'-r' !4AP-r- S r ~' l7 f I'.!LKt J, fl.Ly r S - I 
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searched the trunk of the car and found 350 pounds of mari-
juana. A search of the house revealed marijuana, weapons, 
and drug paraphernalia. 
The activities of respondents corresponded almost pre-
cisely with the predictive statements contained in the letter, 
making this an a fortiori case under D.:31!2[ v. United States, 
358 U. S. 307 (1959). Despite this strong corroboration, the 
Illinois courts suppressed the evidence obtained from the 
search warrants. Applying the two-pronged test of Aguil.{;r 
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court 
concluded that the anonymous letter failed either to state the 
basis of the informant's knowledge or to provide sufficient in-
formation to evaluate the truthfulness of the informant.* 
The Illinois court found the substantial corroboration insuffi-
cient to cure these defects because it failed to establish that 
the informant based the tip on personal knowledge. The Illi-
nois Court-misapplying Draper-also concluded that great 
detail in the anonymous tip is not, alone, sufficient to estab-
lish the veracity of the informant. Finally, the Court ob-
served that the corroborating evidence was of "clearly inno-
~ty. 
In Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), this 
Court found probable cause when a previously-reliable infor-
mant supplied information describing the defendant's cloth-
ing and physical appearance and stating that the defendant 
would be at a train at a certain time as part of a drug transac-
tion. The police arrested and searched defendant after the 
information from the informant was corroborated by the per-
sonal observation of the police. The activity involved in 
Draper, like the activity in this case, was not criminal when 
viewed in isolation. When Draper's activity was viewed in 
*The Illinois Supreme Court cited provisions from both the federal and 
state constitutions. It is readily apparent from the decision, however, 
that the Illinois Supreme Court was relying on federal constitutional 
grounds to justify its holding. State Tax Comm'n v. VanCott, 306 U. S. 
511, 514 (1939) (state and federal grounds so interwoven that it is impossi-
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light of the informant's information, however, it took on an 
"aura of suspicion" sufficient to justify a finding of probable 
cause. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 418 (1969). 
In ~i, supra, an affidavit in support of a search war-
rant contained information that a "confidential reliable in-
formant" had stated that a bookkeeping operation was being 
maintained at a certain address. The police also observed 
activities consistent with a bookkeeping operation, but which 
were in themselves innocent. In holding that the inform-
ant's information was not sufficient to establish probable 
cause, the Court noted that "it is especially important that 
the E£ describe the accused's criminal activit in sufficient 
detail that the rna · stra e may now tlia he is relying on 
something more substan ·a than a casua rumor circulating in 
the un erwor doran accusatiOn ased mere yon an individ-
ual's general reputation." 393 U. S., at 416 (emphasis 
added). In this case, as in Draper, the judicial officer issuing 
the warrant could resonably infer from the detailed informa-
tion, which was provided by the informant and subsequently 
corroborated by the police, that the informant was indeed 
trustworthy and had obtained his information in a "reliable 
way." Spinelli, 393 U. S., at 417. Verification of reliability 
of both the information and the informant was the purpose of 
the two-pronged Aguilar rule. Draper and Spinelli estab-
lish that this verification may come from the police corrobora-
tion of the detailed tip of an anonymous informant. 
In light of the established guidelines of Draper and 
Spinelli, I would grant the petition for certiorari and sum-
marily reverse the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court:--
Court . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
19 ... Argued . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ., 
19 ... ·voted on · · · · · · · · · · · · · ., 
.. . . 19 ... Assigned .................. , No. 
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.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
November 5, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 81-430 - Illinois v. Gates 
The suggested order for reargument in this case is 
as follows: 
"This case is restored to the 
calendar for reargument. In addition to the 
question presented in the petition for 
certiorari and previously argued here, the 
parties are requested to address the question 
whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a 
criminal trial of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 u.s. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 u.s. 383 (1914), should to any 
extent be modified, so as, for example, not 
to require the exclusion of evidence obtained 
in the reasonable belief that the search and 
seizure at issue was consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment." 
November 11, 1982 
81-430 - Illinois v. Gates 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the 
Illinois Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the 
parties to address. That decision was consistent with the 
Court's settled practice of not permitting a party to advance a -
ground for reversal that was not presented below. The reversal -------------""""------·------today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a flagrant 
departure from its settled practice, but also raises serious 
questions concerning the Court's management of its certiorari 
jurisdiction. I am therefore unable to join the Court's decision 
to order reargument of this case. 
I 
As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litigation 
are minimized and the ~ecisional process is expedited if a court 
is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses. We set a poor 
example for other judges when we suddenly reverse our prior 
rulings in the same case. 
I 
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On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion 
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for 
review in this case. The motion asked the Court to incorporate 
the following question: 
"Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to 
obtain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 u.s. 108 (1964), should the evidence 
obtained under the warrant nevertheless be admitted at 
trial because the police acted in a reasonable good 
faith belief in the validity of the warrant?" 
On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that motion. On 
October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of argument; they 
respected our decision and did not attempt to argue the question 
of good faith. Today, the Court asks the parties to reargue the 
case in order to address the very question it would not allow the -
parties to argue last month. This type of inconsistent 
decisionmaking always imposes unnecessary costs on litigants and 
is wasteful of the judiciary's most scarce resource--time. 
II 
As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally 
undesirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's 
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportunity to 
consider. 1 It is especially poor practice to do so when the 
1of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new 
argument as an alternative basis for affirming the decision 
below. E. g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240 n.6 
Footnote continued on next page. 
l'<Vo O.J..-"t.:>U 
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basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which neither 
party adduced any evidence. Those considerations apply with 
...._:----=-----... 
special force when the judgment of the highest court of a 
sovereign state is being reviewed. 2 
Each of these considerations applies to the additional 
question on which the Court has ordered reargument. Neither 
party gave the Circuit Court of DuPage County, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois, Second District, or the Supreme Court of 
{1977) • 
2writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 u.s. 
437, JUSTICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the 
Court's traditional stance. 
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal 
constitutional issues raised here for the first time on 
review of state court decisions both before [Crowell v. 
Randell, 10 Pet. 368 {1836)], Miller v. Nicholls, 4 
Wheat. 311, 315 {1819), and since, e.g., Safeway 
Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., Inc., 
360 U.S. 334, 342, n.7 {1959); State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160-163 
{1945); McGoldrick v. Compagnie General 
Transatlantique, 309 u.s. 430, 434-435 {1940); Whitney 
v. California, 274 u.s. 357, 362-363 (1927); Dewey v. 
DesMoines, 173 u.s. 193, 197-201 (1899); Murdock v. 
City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
* * * 
"Questions not raised below are those on which the 
record is very likely to be inadequate, since it 
certainly was not compiled with those questions in 
mind." 394 U.S., at 438-439. 
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 u.s. 308, 317 
(1937); Wilson v. Cook, 327 u.s. 474, 483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc. 
v. Adkins, 395 u.s. 653, 677-682 (WHITE, J., concurring). See 
generally R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 456-465 
(5th ed. 1978). 
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Illinois an opportunity to consider the question. Neither party 
offered any evidence concerning the state of mind of the 
magistrate when he issued the warrant, the state of mind of the 
officers who obtained the warrant, or the state of mind of the 
officers who executed the warrant~ In short, the new issue was 
not "fairly presented" to the state courts. Cf. Picard v. 
Connor, 404 u.s. 270 {1971). 
III 
As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject to 
question. That question is serious whether one assumes that the 
Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question correctly 
or incorrectly. 
On the one hand, if it is assumed that the · Supreme Court of 
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was 
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment. 
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 u.s. 308, 317 {1937). 
If the only federal question presented by a certiorari petition 
is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legitimate basis 
for reversal, this Court has no power to grant certiorari simply 
because it would like to address some other federal question. 
3The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on 
the basis of an affidavit such as that filed by the police 
officer in this case. 
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For neither Article III of the Constitution nor the 
jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this Court with 
any roving authority to decide federal questions that have not 
been properly raised in adversary litigation. 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court 
of Illinois has incorrectly decided the federal question that was 
presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judgment. 
That duty could be performed by simply answering the question 
decided below, without reaching the additional question on which 
the Court orders reargument today. It is, of course, a settled 
canon of our constitutional jurisprudence that we do not decide 
constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so to 
resolve an actual case or controversy. See e.g., Minnick v. 
California Dept. of Corrections, 452 u.s. 105, 122-27 (1981). 
Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal 
question that has already been argued, the action it takes today 
sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of the scope 
of its powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt <!Jcnrl cf tqt 1tniftb ;§taf.tg 
jirulfhtghm. ~. <!f. 20.?'!~ 
November 4, 1982 
Re: No. 81-430 Illinois v. Gates 
Dear John: 
I doubt the wisdom of adding the question you propose 
for reargument in this case to the question already 
formulated by Byron. It seems to me we already have one 
basis for reversal which seems to command a majority of 
the Court; retrenching somewhat from Aguilar and Spinelli 
and re-establishing Draper. The reason, as I understood 
it, why you suggested the case should be re-argued if a 
majority wished to reach the question now posed by Byron 
was that the petitioner itself had requested an enlargement 
of the questions presented to include that issue, and its 
request had been denied by the Court. But I see no reason 
for simply adding a "garden variety" probable cause issue 
under the decision in Ross; I dare say there would be few, 
if any, to grant certiorari in the first place if that were 
all the case involved. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Stevens 






JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u.prtmt <!Jourt of tqt ~tb .§tatts 
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/ 
November 12, 1982 
Re:No. 81-430 - ILLINOIS v. GATES 
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From: Justice Stevens 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-430 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES, ET ux. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[November-, 1982] 
JUSTICE · STEVENS, dissenting. 
Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the Illinois 
Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the par-
ties to address. That decision was consistent with the 
Court's settled practice of not pennitting a party to advance 
a ground for reversal that was not presented below. The re-
versal today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a fla-
grant departure from its settled practice, but also raises seri-
ous questions concerning the Court's management of its 
certiorari jurisdiction. I am therefore unable to join the 
Court;s decision to order reargument of this case. 
I 
As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litiga-
tion are minimized and the decisional process is expedited if a 
court is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses. we set 
a poor example for other judges when we suddenly reverse 
our prior rulings in the same case. 
On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion 
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for 
review in this case. The motion asked the Court to incorpo-
rate the following question: 
"Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to ob-
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378 U. S. 108 (1964), should the evidence obtained under 
the warrant nevertheless be admitted at trial because 
the police acted in a reasonable good faith belief in the 
validity of the warrant?" 
On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that mo-
tion. On October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of 
argument; they respected our decision and did not attempt to 
argue the question of good faith. Today, the Court asks the 
parties to reargue the case in order to address the very ques-
tion it would not allow the parties to argue last month. This 
type of inconsistent decisionmaking always imposes unnec-
essary costs on litigants and is wasteful of the judiciary's 
most scarce resource--time. 
II 
As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally unde-
sirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's 
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportu-
nity to consider. 1 It is especially poor practice to do so when 
the basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which nei-
ther party adduced any evidence. Those considerations ap-
ply with special force when the judgment of the highest court 
of a sovereign state is being reviewed. 2 Each of these con-
1 Of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new argument as an 
alternative basis for affirming the decision below. E. g., Hankerson v. 
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 240 n. 6 (1977). 
'Writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 U. S. 437, Jus-
TICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the Court's traditional 
stance. 
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues 
raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions both before 
[Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836)], Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, 
315 (1819), and since, e. g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Gro-
cers Assn., Inc., 360 U. S. 334, 342, n. 7 (1959); State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160-163 (1945); McGoldrick v. 
Compagnie General Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434-435 (1940); Whit-
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siderations applies to the additional question on which the 
Court has ordered reargument. Neither party gave the Cir-
cuit Court of DuPage County, the Appellate Court of Illinois, 
Second District, or the Supreme Court of Illinois an opportu-
nity to consider the question. Neither party offered any evi-
dence concerning the state of mind of the magistrate when he 
issued the warrant, the state of mind of the officers who ob-
tained the warrant, or the state of mind of the officers who 
executed the warrant. In short, the new issue was · not 
"fairly presented" to the state courts. . Cf. Picard v. Con-
nor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971). 
III 
As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject toques-
tion. That question is serious whether one assumes that the 
Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question cor-
rectly or incorrectly. 
On the one hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was 
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment. 
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 
(1937). If the only federal question presented by a certiorari 
petition is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legiti-
ney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1927); Dewey v. DesMoines, 173 
U. S. 193, 197-201 (1899); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 
(1875). 
* * * 
"Questions not raised below are those on which the record is very likely to 
be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in 
mind." 394 U. S., at 438-439. 
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 (1937); Wil-
son v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474,483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 
653, 677~2 (WHITE, J., concurring). See generally R. Stern & E. Gress-
man, Supreme Court Practice 456-465 (5th ed. 1978). 
8 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on the basis of an affida-
vit such as that filed by the police officer in this case. 
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mate basis for reversal, this Court has no power to grant cer-
tiorari simply because it would like to address some other 
federal question. For neither Article III of the Constitution 
nor the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this 
Court with any roving authority to decide federal questions 
that have not been properly raised in adversary litigation. 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court 
of Illinois has incorrectly decid~d the federal question that 
was presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judg-
ment. That duty could be performed by simply answering 
the question decided below, without reaching the additional 
question on which the Court orders reargument today. It is, 
of course, a settled canon of our constitutional jurisprudence 
that we do not decide constitutional questions unless it is nec-
essary to do so to resolve an actual case or controversy. See 
e. g., Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S. 
105, 122-127 (1981). 
Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal 
question that has already been argued, the action it takes to-
day sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of the 
scope of its powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
? • 
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From: Justice Stevens 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
.ttld: --
"" 1 c.ulated:_ 
No. 81-430 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES, ET ux. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[November-, 1982] · 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the Illinois 
Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the par-
ties to address. That decision was consistent with the 
Court's settled practice of not permitting a party to advance 
a ground for reversal that was not presented below. There-
versal today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a fla-
grant departure from its settled practice, but also raises seri-
ous questions concerning the Court's management of its 
certiorari jurisdiction. I am therefore unable to join the 
Court's decision to order reargument of this case. 
I 
As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litiga-
tion are minimized and the decisional process is expedited if a 
court is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses. We set 
a poor example for other judges when we suddenly reverse 
our prior rulings in the same case. 
On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion 
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for 
review in this case. The motion asked the Court to incorpo-
rate the following question: 
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tain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U. S. 108 (1964), should the evidence obtained under 
the warrant nevertheless be admitted at trial because 
the police acted in a reasonable good faith belief in the 
validity of the warrant?" 
On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that mo-
tion. On October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of 
argument; they respected our decision and did not attempt to 
argue the question of good faith. Today, the Court asks the 
parties to reargue the case in order to address the very ques-
tion it would not allow the parties to argue last month. This 
type of inconsistent decisionmaking always imposes unnec-
essary costs on litigants and is wasteful of the judiciary's 
most scarce resource-time. 
II 
As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally unde-
sirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's 
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportu-
nity to consider. 1 It is especially poor practice to do so when 
the basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which 
neither party adduced any evidence. Those considerations 
apply with added force when the judgment of the highest 
court of a sovereign state is being reviewed. 2 
1 Of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new argument as an 
alternative basis for affirming the decision below. E. g., Hankerson v. 
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 240 n. 6 (1977). 
2 Writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 U. S. 437, Jus-
TICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the Court's traditional 
stance. 
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional is-
sues raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions 
both before [Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836)], Miller v. 
Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, 315 (1819), and since, e. g., Safeway Stores, 
Inc. v. OklahomaRetailGrocersAssn., Inc., 360 U.S. 334,342, n. 7 
(1959); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins . Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 
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Each of these considerations applies to the additional ques-
tion on which the Court has ordered reargument. Neither 
party gave the Circuit Court of DuPage County, the Appel-
late Court of Illinois, Second District, or the Supreme Court 
of Illinois an opportunity to consider the question. Neither 
party offered any evidence concerning the state of mind of 
the magistrate when he issued the warrant, the state of mind 
of the officers who obtained the warrant, or the state of mind 
of the officers who executed the warrant. In short, the new 
issue was not "fairly presented" to the state courts. Cf. 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971). 
III 
As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject to ques-
tion. That question is serious whether one assumes that the 
Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question cor-
rectly or incorrectly. 
On the one hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was 
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment. 
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 
(1937). If the only federal question presented by a certiorari 
154, 160-163 (1945); McGoldrick v. Compagnie General Transatlan-
tique, 309 U. S. 430, 434-435 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 
357, 362-363 (1927); Dewey v. DesMoines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-201 
(1899); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
* * * 
"Questions not raised below are those on which the record is very 
likely to be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those 
questions in mind." 394 U. S., at 438-439. 
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 (1937); Wil-
son v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474,483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 
653, 677-682 (1969) (WHITE, J., concurring). See generally R. Stern & 
E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 456-465 (5th ed. 1978). 
8 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on the basis of an affida-
vit such as that filed by the police officer in this case. 
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petition is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legiti-
mate basis for reversal, this Court has no power to grant cer-
tiorari simply because it would like to address some other 
federal question. For neither Article III of the Constitution 
nor the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this 
Court with any roving authority to decide federal questions 
that have not been properly raised in adversary litigation. 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court 
of Illinois has incorrectly decided the federal question that 
was presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judg-
ment. That duty could be performed by simply answering 
the question decided below, without reaching the additional 
question on which the Court orders reargument today. It is, 
of course, a settled canon of our constitutional jurisprudence 
that we do not decide constitutional questions unless it is nec-
essary to do so to resolve an actual case or controversy. See 
e. g., Minnick v. Cal·ifornia Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S. 
105, 122-127 (1981). 
Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal 
question that has already been argued, the action it takes 
today sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of 
the scope of its powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
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I. Background 
A. Facts 
On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale (Illinois) police chief 
received a handwritten letter in the mail. The letter read, in 
its entirety, as follows: 
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple 
in your town who~trictly make their ~ing on selling 
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on 
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. 
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife 
drives their car to Florid~where she leaves it to be 
loaded up with drugs, then L~ce fl[ie]s down and 
drives it back. Sue~l [ ie] s back after she drops the ~ L ~ 
car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there ~ 
again and Lance will be fll in~~~n a few days to ~
drive it b~k. At the time Lance drives the c ar back . 
he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. 
Presently they~have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in 
their basement. 
They brag about the fact they never have to work, 
and make their entire living on pushers. 
I guar[a]ntee if you watch them carefully you will 
make a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs 
dealers, who visit their house often. 
Lance & Sue Gates 
Greenway 
in Condominiums. 
The letter was entirely anonymous: it was unsigned and there was 
no return address. The police chief passed it on to a detective 
in the department for investigation. 
According to the Illinois Secretary of State's office, a 
Lance B. Gates, living at 209D Dartmouth in Bloomingdale, had 
been issued an Illinois driver's license. The physical descrip-
tion given on the license indicated that Gates was a 30-year-old 
male, 5' ll~tall, with brown eyes and hair, and weighing 220 
pounds. A reliable "con~nt" told police that a 
Lance B. Gates, who had formerly lived at 209D Dartmouth, now 
bench memo: IlJinois v. Gates page 3. 
lived at 198B Greenway Drive in Bloomingdale. Further investiga-
tion revealed that an L. Gates had reserved a seat for May 5 on 
Eastern Airlines flight 245 from Chicago to West Palm Beach, 
Florida. The call-back number on the reservation was 980-8427. 
According to Illinois Bell Telephone Company records, this number 






Pursuant to an arrangement with the Bloomingdale police, 
agent observed all of the passengers boarding Eastern Air-
flight 245 on May 5. ~e passenger used the name Lance 
and ~bed the physical description from the driver's li-
Other DEA agents observed the arrival of flight 245 in 
.-' 
West Palm Beach. The passenger identified as Gates remained in 
the, air~rt for~our, then took a taxi to the West Palm Beach 
Holiday Inn. There he entered a room ~egisteLed in the name of 
/susan Gates. 
The following morning at 7:00, Gates and an unidentified 
female left the Holiday Inn and entered a red and gray Mercury -
bearing Illinois license RS8437. {This license number was issued 
~----------'------- -to Lance B. Gates for a 1975 Hornet station wagon.) The two left 
West Palm Beach in the Mercury on the northbound interstate high-
way. The driving time from West Palm Beach to Bloomingdale is 
approximately 21-23 hours. 
The police presented all of this information to an asso-
1 It is not clear whether 198B or 189B is the correct address. 
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ciate judge of the county circuit court. He granted a search -------.... ,
warrant for the resps' residence and the Mercury they were driv-
i~g fJom Florida. At 5:15a.m. on May 7, resps arrived home 
driving the Mercury. 
----- 1 .~ 
Police met them on arrival, served the ~· 
~
search warrant, and searched the car and home. They discovered 
350 pounds of marijuana in the car, and other incriminating evi-
dence in both car and home. 
B. Decisions Below 
Resps moved before trial to quash the search warrant and 
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search. They 
argued that the information provided by the anonymous letter, 
even when coupled with the police corroboration of innocent de-
tails, was insufficient to provide probable cause for the issu-
~ ance of the warrant. The TC granted the motion. 
The ~p. Ct. and th~Ill. s.ct. affirmed, each holding 
that the warrant failed to comply with the requirements of 
~guilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The affidavit in support 
of the warrant had not satisfied either the "basis of knowledge" 
or the "veracity" prong of the Aguilar test. The "self-verifying 
detail" doctrine of Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 410 
(1969) , was not satisfied, and thus could not save the warrant. 
Justice Moran, joined by Justice Underwood, dissented in 
the Ill. S.Ct. He argued that this case more closely resembled ~ 
Draper v. United States, 358 u.s. 307 (1959), than Aguilar or 
Spinelli. 
II. Discussion 
In working on this case, I cannot help remembering the 
well-worn maxim that "hard cases make bad law." I have read the 
CHIEF JUSTICE's proposed dissent from denial of cert, arguing 
that the decision below should be summarily reversed, and this 
reinforces my concern. As in almost all exclusionary rule cases, 
the defendants are~ndeniably guilty--but that is obviously ir-
relevant. What really makes this a hard case is the fact that 
the police did a~~utely nothin~ wrong. 
~ ---~ .... They made what appears 
to have been an honest effort to investigate the anonymous tip, 
verifying as much detail as they could in the time available. 
They presented the results of their labors to a supposedly neu-
tral and detached judicial officer to obtain a search warrant. 
And they executed the warrant in an entirely reasonable manner. 
It is almost offensive to see two large-scale drug dealers go 
free because an associate judge of the county circuit court made 
a mistake in issuing the warrant, but I think that any other 
course would seriously erode the meaning of "probable cause." 
Although I have noted your preliminary inclination to reverse, I 
recommend that the decision below be affirmed. 
A. The Legal Standards 
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 u.s. 108 (1964), the police 
obtained a search warrant from a justice of the peace on the ba-
sis of an affidavit claiming "reliable information from a credi-
ble person" that narcotics were illegally kept on the premises in 
question. The affidavit did not explain why the information was 
• 
reliable or the person credible. The Court held that this was 
inadequate, and announced a two-part testt9f~~~ 
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay~for­
mation ••. , the magistrate must be informed of QJlD some 
of the underlying circumstances from which the infor-
mant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed 
they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances 
from which the officer concluded that the informant •.• 
was "credible" or his information "reliable." 
Point [1] has come to be known Id., at~ (footnote omitted). 
as the basis of knowledge" prong of the Aguilar test, and point 
[2) as thev.:'veracity" prong. 
v 
Dicta in Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 410 (1969), 
relaxed the "basis of knowledge" prong slightly. There the po-
lice were again relying on information from a known confidential 
informant, and there was again ~o indication of the source of his 
information. The Court declared: 
In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in 
which the information was gathered, it is especially 
important that the tip descrjbe the accused's criminal 
activity in s~fficient detail that the magistrate may 
know-l~at fi e 1s relYi ng-on something more substantial 
than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an ~ 
accusati erely on an individual's general rep-
utation. P~ 
./ ~\ 
Id., at 416. The Court cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 
307 (1959) , as an example of a case where the informant provided 
information so detailed that a magistrate could reasonably infer 
that it had been obtained in a reliable way. The information in 
Spinelli, however, was so general that it "could easily have been 
obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." 




Spinelli also considered the possibility that indepen-
dent police investigation verifying portions of the informant's 
information could be sufficient to save a tip that was inadequate 
on its own. The Court suggested that a tip that was partially 
corroborated might be "as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's 
""'------- - -
requirements when standing alone," id., at 416, but found that 
such was not the case there. The tipster had informed police 
that the suspect was conducting illegal gambling operations in a 
particular apartment with particular telephone numbers. The in-
vestigation had revealed that the suspect regularly travelled to 
the apartment, and that the telephones were located inside it. 
In rejecting the government's argument, the Court declared: 
At most, these [independent investigative efforts] in-
dicated that [the suspect] could have used the tele-
phones specified by the informant for some purpose. 
This cannot by itself be said to support both the in-
ference that the informer was generally trustworthy and 
that he had made his charge against [the suspect] on 
the basis of information obtained in a reliable way. 
Id., at 417. This situation was again contrasted with Draper, 
where the police corroborated information so detailed that it 
could only have been obtained by a person with an appropriate 
basis of knowledge. 
B. The Informant's Basis of Information 
Simply reading the letter that initiated the investiga-
tion here, supra page 2, it immediately strikes me that the sole 
~· ~ ~ source of information was rumor in the community. If I had to 
guess the author's identity, I would say that she is a housewife ~ 
~ whose husband is a blue-collar laborer. Although he works hard,
~ 
1-o~ ~. 
they still have trouble making ends meet, so she resents the easy 
wealth that she hears resps have acquired. This is, of course, 
mere conjecture. Such a letter could just as easily have been 
written by the victim of the Gates child's latest practical joke, 
or someone playing a malicious practical joke on resps. Perhaps 
even a jealous business riva1. 2 The important fact here is that 
nothing in the letter makes any of these possibilities unlikely. 
Nor are they disproven by the additional evidence. On the con-
trary, the police corroboration strengthens my belief that the 
tipster's information was based on community rumor. 
To begin with, it seems clear that the anonymous infor-
mant had no direct contact with resps. Although (s)he knew that 
resps lived "in the condominiums," this is not the specific sort 
of information that someone with direct knowledge would have. 3 
It "could easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard 
at a neighborhood bar." Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 417. The 
last two paragraphs also smack of a rumor being repeated. It is 
very unlikely that the informant had seen any of the "big drugs 
dealers who visit their house often" when (s)he does not know 
which house is resps'. And the letter does not sound as if it 
were written by someone to whom resps would directly "brag about 
the fact they never have to work." 
2If the author had known resps' address, I might have guessed 
an irate neighbor upset by loud parties late at night. 
3THE CHIEF JUSTICE states in his proposed dissent from denial 
of cert that the letter gave resps' address. I assume he based 
this statement on the pool memo, which makes the same error. 
? 
The strongest information in the letter is the part 
characterized by the CHIEF JUSTICE as "a detailed description of 
respondent[s'] method of operation." I view the detail as the 
sort that could easily be obtained through neighborhood gossip. 
If the letter conveyed all of the information that the informant 
had, gossip is the only likely source. There is no specific de-
tail, such as the informant in Draper provided. The letter was 
obviously written with this particular trip in mind, but there is ~ 
no mention of the flight that Lance Gates would take, or even the 
city in Florida that was involved. The letter does not even men-
tion the type of drugs in which resps dealt. Even the dollar 
figures sound like the product of rumor. $100,000 is a lot of 
money, and would clearly seem staggering to anyone in the commu-
nity. But for a full-time drug dealer, the amount seems low. It 
is not a sum that would be stressed so heavily by someone who had 
first-hand familiarity with the business. 4 In essence, the let-
ter here does nothing more than set out the bare outlines of a 
simple, five-step ~oce:s: {1) Sue drives the car down to Flori-
da. {2) Sue flies back to Bloomingdale. {3) The car is "loaded 
up with drugs." {4) Lance flies down to Florida. {5) Lance 
drives the car back to Bloomingdale. I do not see enough there 
4In one of my cases last year, for example, the government ar-
ranged a controlled buy from a full-time dealer for well over 
$100,000. This was a single sale on the street, and the dealer 
tried to convince the undercover agent to take twice the amount--
but the government did not have the funds. Evidence at trial 
indicated that a delivery to "the stash" would be about two or-
ders of magnitude higher. 
to satisfy the Aguilar test. 
The state argues th 
rated enough details in 
disageee. In the first 
were the least specific. The police verified that resps lived .. .___........._ 
"in the condominiums." They in fact learned the specific address 
(although there was some disagreement between their confidential 
informant and the telephone company) that someone with first-hand 
knowledge of resps could easily have provided. And they learned 
that Lance was flying down to a city in Florida "a few days" af-
/3J-
ter May 3. Once again, the police obtained the specific informa-~ 
tion that someone with first-hand knowledge could have provided.~~ 
~ 
Even more important, though,~as the result of the po- ~r-
lice attempt to corroborate some of the slightly more specific ~ 
information. Here they discovered that the anonymous informant~• 
~ 
had the rough idea (such as could be learned from neighborhood 
rumor) but did not have it "quite right." The informant, for ~ 
example, had said that Sue would drive the car down to Florida on~ 
May 3, "leav [ e] it to be loaded up with drugs," and fly bac~~.,~~ 
The police never did verify how and when Sue and the car reache~ 
Florida, although the obvious inference is that she drove d~ 
some point. But she did not "dro[p] the car off," and "leav[e] 
..... 
it to be loaded up with drugs," nor did she fly back back to Chi-
cago while Lance drove the car. Even with corroboration, the 
letter does not satisfy the "basis of information" prong of the 
Aguilar test. 
bench memo: Illinois v. Gates page 11. 
c. The Informant's Veracity 
Under Aguilar, the magistrate issuing the warrant must 
be able to conclude that the informant was "credible" and his 
information "reliable." As an example, the Aguilar Court specif-
ically endorsed the affidavit in Jones v. United States, 362 u.s. 
257, 267 n.2 (1960). That affidavit told the commissioner that 
the informant had provided reliable information in the past, and 
that the information in question had also been obtained from oth-
er sources. 378 U.S., at 114 & n.S. ~~ 
Here, in contrast, there <i s--rtOthing o indicate that the ~ 
author of the anonymous letter is credibl , or that his/her in-~ 
~ 
formation is reliable. The state a;gues that a "citizen infer-
mant" should be presumed reliable, since there is no apparent 
motive to lie. It cites cases in which crime victims, eye-
witnesses, or witnesses sought out by the police have given in-
formation that has been found acceptable. But these are all 
cases in which witnesses' identities were known to the police, 
and the witnesses were known to have been in a position to obtain 
the information on which the police relied. None involved an 
anonymous tipster. Although the state may be correct to say that 
there was no apparent motive for a "citizen informant" to lie, 
this is only because nothing5 is apparent about the informant. 
There was also no apparent motive to tell the truth. There are 
numerous possible motives to lie, and the anonymous letter pro-
5The state frequently stresses his/her citizenship, but even 
this is conjecture. 
vides the perfect opportunity to do so without fear of responsi-
bility. Furthermore, even if the state is correct, its argument 
could prove only that the informant thought (s)he was telling the 
truth. There is no reason to suppose that (s)he in fact knew the 
truth. Perhaps (s)he honestly believed that anyone travelling to 
Florida was a drug dealer. 
The state also argues that the suspicious circumstances 
of the trip tended to show that the letter was credible. The 
argument is essentially that resps satisfied a "drug courier pro-
file" like the one at issue in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146. 
This is ridiculous. The only suspicious aspect of the trip was 
~~ ~apid turn-aro~nd, 6 and there are many possibl~explana­
tions for that. There was no suggestion that Lance paid for his 
trip in cash, or carried little luggage. Other circumstances 
also tend to indicate that the trip was legitimate. Unlike al-
most every drug courier profile case, Lance travelled under his 
own name, and gave the airline his proper telephone number. He 
did not rush out of the airport in West Palm Beach, but waited an 
hour before leaving. Susan had registered in the Holiday Inn 
under her own name. The car's license plates were issued to 
Lance in his own name. 7 In sum, resps did not fit any rational 
6Note that Susan did not necessarily have a rapid turn-around. 
Even if the letter is correct on this point, she at least spent a 
few days in Florida--much longer than would be needed simply to 
pick up drugs. 
7The discrepancy between the Mercury, which resps were driving, 
and the Hornet, for which the plates were issued, may indicate 
some illegality, but it does not indicate drug-running. 
"drug courier profile." Furthermore, even if they did, that 
would not necessarily provide probable cause. In most of the 
drug courier profile cases, the courts have held at best that 
conformity with the profile provided articulable suspicion justi-
fying a limited intrusion--not probable cause justifying an ar-
rest or search. 
Even with corroboration that the police were able to ? 
obtain, the letter does not satisfy the "veracity" prong of the 
Aguilar test. 
D. The Context of the Case 
The principal difficulty I have with this case is the 
context in which the issue is presented to the Court. The ques-
tion, unfortunately, is not whether the police acted reasonably. 
I think they ~~id. The question is whether there was 
probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and 
this is a different issue. 
The Court denied the state's motion to amend or enlarge 
the question presented to include the issue of a "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. The amicii nevertheless 
brief the point, so I will mention it here. In this situation 
the exclusionary rule does not serve any direct deterrent pur-
pose. Indeed, the police should not be deterred from presenting 
their evidence to a neutral magistrate to obtain a search war-
rant. But if the exclusionary rule did not apply in these cir-
cumstances, the magistrate's decision--made in an ex parte 
proceeding--would be effectively isolated from appellate review. 
~~A.. 
There would then be a real risk that some magistrates~uld be-
come little more than "rubber stamps" for police requests. The 
Court should take care to prevent such a result. See Aguilar, 
supra, 378 U.S., at 111 ("[T]he court must still insist that the 
magistrate perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not 
serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police."). 
Concluding that the circumstances presented here were 7 
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause would also have 1 
far-reaching consequences. I have no doubt that the police had 
articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a limited investiga-
tory stop. 8 This would have been a very different case if the 
police had approached resps and asked them what they were carry-
ing in their trunk. If probable cause were determined on a con-
tinuum, this would also be a different case. I do not argue that 
it was necessarily "unreasonable" for the police to make the lim-
ited intrusion that was made here. But the Court has always re-
jected such balancing tests. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979). It is therefore not enough that the 
police may have had sufficient cause to justify a very limited 
search. They conducted a search requiring a warrant, and as a 
result "probable cause" is required. If the Court relaxes the 
standards of probable cause here, it relaxes them in the context 
8The state relies heavily on Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972), claiming that there was less evidence of probable cause 
there than here. Williams, however, was initially a Terry-stop 
case. It was only after the officer discovered a weapon that 
there was probable cause to justify the arrest and the search 
that revealed the drugs. 
of a much more intrusive search. It even relaxes them in the 
context of an arrest, for although the conclusions justifying 
search and arrest warrants are different, each must be supported 
by the same level of probable cause. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily, 436 u.s. 547, 556 n.6 (1978). The evidence here sup-
ported the conclusion that resps were guilty more strongly than 
it supported the conclusion that there would be drugs in the car 
and house, but it seems clear that, prior to the discovery of the 
marijuana, the police did not have probable cause to arrest resps 
at 5:15 a.m. Yet the legal standard is theoretically the same. 
III. Conclusion 
The proper disposition of this case would have been to ~ 
deny cert. It is little more than a factual dispute over the 
application of the Aguilar principles. It is not governed by 
Draper. An affirmance will simply establish that Aguilar retains 
is precedential force, clarifying that a totally anonymous tip-
ster is not a better source of information than a confidential 
informant known to the police. A reversal, on the other hand, 
could seriously undermine the meaning of "probable 
not only searches, but also arrests, easier to obtain on the ba-
sis of community rumor. 
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./ _ Q JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
r ~ I Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for vi-
.- _. IJ 0 olation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a 
~ search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraband 
_./) r /J - in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gates 
moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The 
~ ~ Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state 
courts granting the motion. It held that the affidavit sub-
~ d .in support of the State's application for a warrant to 
search the Gates's property was inadequate under this 
.-lu ..,._ LV t-r,Z Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) 
1-/,{4.A and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 
_ .1J tJ • /7-dA.bt __... We granted certiorari to consider the application of the 
~ ., ....-- - Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a search 
- 11 /J I- d PAl warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous 
~) informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral ar-
iA--(_ (l~J V, gument on this question, however, we requested the parties 
to address an additional question: 
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal 
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any ex-
tent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the 
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief 
APR I I 1983 
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that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment." 
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we 
framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois courts 
and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the 
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, 
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the re-
quirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restric-
tively. Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not 
addressin ~ question regar mg modificatiOn of the ex-
clusionary rule er of November 29, 1982, 
-'tL s:==:. 
I 
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state courts 
derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides that "Final 
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a 
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court as follows: ... (3) By writ of certiorari, 
... where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially 
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes 
of ... the United States." The provision derives, albeit 
with important alterations, see, e. g., Act of December 23, 
1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 
929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85. 
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of 
§ 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in some re-
spects not entirely clear. We held early on that § 25 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no jurisdiction unless 
a federal question had been both raised and decided in the 
state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v. 
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 391 (1836), "If both of these require-
ments do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction 
fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch. 344 
(1809). 1 
'The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, supra, that a federal claim 
81-430---0PINION 
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More recently, in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309 
U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), the Court observed: 
But it is also the settled practice of this Court, in the ex-
ercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it is only in excep-
tional cases, and then only in cases coming from the fed-
eral courts, that it considers questions urged by a 
petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the 
courts below. . . . In cases coming here from state 
courts in which a state statute is assailed as unconstitu-
tional, there are reasons of peculiar force which should 
lead us to refrain from deciding questions not presented 
or decided in the highest court of the state whose judicial 
action we are called upon to review. Apart from there-
luctance with which every court should proceed to set 
aside legislation as unconstitutional on grounds not prop-
erly presented, due regard for the appropriate relation-
ship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to 
consider and decide questions affecting the validity of 
state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for 
these reasons that this Court, where the constitutional-
ity of a statute has been upheld in the state court, con-
sistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not 
raised or decided in that court. 
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional char-
acter of the rule against our deciding claims "not pressed nor 
passed upon" in state court in State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 160 (1945), where 
have been both raised and addressed in state court was generally not un-
derstood in the literal fashion in which it was phrased. See R. Robertson 
& F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 60 
(1951). Instead, the Court developed the rule that a claim would not be 
considered here unless it had been either raised or squarely considered and 
resolved in state court. See, e. g., McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 
309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940); State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Duel, 
324 u. s. 154, 160 (1945). 
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we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme Court did not 
pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v. 
California, 401 U. S. 797, 805--806 (1971). 
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our 
more recent cases have treated the so-called "not ressed or 
passed upon below" rule as me~ely a prudentraf restriction. 
In 1'ermintetlo v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949), the Court re-
versed a state criminal conviction on a ground not urged in 
state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v. 
New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily 
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not raised 
in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court indicated in a footnote, id., at 4 79, n. 3, that it pos-
sessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court 
the question on which it decided the case. 
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the 
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have recognized 
that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal 
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon 
below. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198 
(1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said 
that "if the question were only an enlargement of the one 
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so con-
nected with it in substance as to form but another ground or 
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judg-
ment, we should have no hesitation in holding the assignment 
sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued. 
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which 
were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal question 
there discussed." 2 We have not attempted, and likely 
2 In Dewey, certain assessments had been levied against the owner of 
property abutting a street paved by the city; a state trial court ordered 
that the property be forfeited when the assessments were not paid, and in 
81-430-0PINION 
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would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between 
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented 
below and those involving entirely new questions. 
The a lication of these principles in the instant case is not 
eJ.lt4rely_ strmghtforwar . £ fs -clear in 1li1s case- thatr e-
spondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judi-
cial system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been 
violated by the actions of the Illinois police and that the evi-
dence seized by the officers should be excluded from their 
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level 
of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the sub-
stantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been 
violated. T~ver, however, raised or addressed 
the question whether the federal excluswnar rule should 
be m'o 1 e m any respect, and none of the opinions of the 
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was 
considered. 
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a 
writ of certiorari. Since the Act of December 23, 1914, c. 2, 
38 Stat . .790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court tore-
view state court decisions even when a claimed federal right 
has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting the "not 
pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, in-
volved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or 
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we 
addition, held appellant personally liable for the amount by which the as-
sessments exceeded the value of the lots. In state court the appellant ar-
gued that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not re-
ceived personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, he 
also attempted to argue that the assessment itself constituted a taking 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, beyond arising 
from a single factual occurrence, the two claims "are not in anywise neces-
sarily connected," id. , at 198. Because of this , we concluded that appel-
lant's taking claim could not be considered. 
81-430--0PINION 
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can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have chal-
lenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure 
of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim. 
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not 
pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, these are as 
applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion 
of a particular federal right, as to a party's failure to have as-
serted the claim. First, "questions not raised below are 
those on which the record is ·very likely to be inadequate 
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in 
mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969). 
Exactly the same difficulty exists when the state urges modi-
fication of an existing constitutional right or accompanying 
remedy. Here, for example, the record contains little, if 
anything, regarding the sp.bjective good faith of the police of-
ficers that searched the Ghtes's property - which might well 
be an important consideration in fashioning a good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of the 
modification of the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit 
from a record containing such facts. 
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of 
this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie 
Generale, 309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), demands that those 
courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutional-
ity of the actions of state officials, and, equally important, 
proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional 
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to 
the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be 
modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the 
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an ade-
quate and independent state ground. See Cardinale, supra, 
394 U. S., at 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclu-
sionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp, 138 
N. E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view even if it 
thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be 
modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to 
81-430--0PINION 
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hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal 
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a 
well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or 
passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier deci-
sions indicate, see --, supra, or prudential, as several of 
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character might 
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhere we 
need not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may be, 
consideration of the question presented in our order of No-
vember 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifica-
tions for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we 
thus decide not to pass on the issue. 
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the 
federal exclusionary rule-suppressing evidence against re-
spondents-does not affect our conclusion. In Morrison v. 
Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to con-
sider whether a state statute impaired the appellant's con-
tract with the appellee. It declined to hear the case because 
the question presented here had not been pressed or passed 
on below. The Court acknowledged that the lower court's 
opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier de-
cision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissi-
bly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that 
there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any 
stage of this case upon the point," id., at 115, and that with-
out such a contest, the routine restatement and application of 
settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not 
pressed or passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the 
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal 
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon 
the point. The application of the exclusionary rule was 
merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the 
Illinois courts on the question whether application of a modi-
fied rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In 
such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary 
? 
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to apprise the state court of the arguments for not applying 
the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the question 
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. 
Likewise, we do not believe that the State's repeated oppo-
sition to respondent's substantive Fourth Amendment claims 
suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary 
rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally" and not "a personal constitutional 
right of the party aggrieved .. " United States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). The question whether the exclu-
sionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context 
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the ques-
tion whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party 
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. 
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980); 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); United 
States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 
(1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modi-
fication or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected 
with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at issue] as 
to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalid-
ity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 173 
U. S., at 197-198. Rather, the rule's modification was, for 
purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a 
separate claim that had to be specifically presented to the 
State courts. 
Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against 
our considering the question presented in our order of No-
vember 29, 1983. The extent of the continued vitality of the 
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Suffi-
cient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue 
that members of this Court recently have made, e. g., Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971) 
81-430-0PINION 
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(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 502 
(Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
537-539 (1976) (WHITE, J., ~en~t·:n · ewer v. Williams, 
430 U. S. 387, 413-414 (1977t~OWELL, J. concurring); Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U. S. 42Q, 437;-< 3-444 (1981) (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public 
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere 
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion. 
By doing so we "promote respect ... for the Court's adjudi-
catory process [and] the stability of [our] decisions." Mapp 
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U. S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual 
record will be available to us, thereby discouraging the fram-
ing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, 
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In 
Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens the 
threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id., at 676 (Har-
lan, J., dissenting), not foreseen at the time of decision. The 
public importance of our decisions in Weeks and M app and 
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these 
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our custom-
ary procedural rules. By following this course, we promote 
respect for the procedures by which our decisions are ren-
dered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions. 
A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court dictates 
that we reserve for another day the question whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be modified. 
II 
We now turn to the question presented in the State's origi-
nal petition for certiorari, which requires us to decide 
whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments were violated by the search of their car 
and house. A chronological statement of events usefully in-
troduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb 
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of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the 
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anony-
mous handwritten letter which read as follows: 
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in 
your town who strictly make their living on selling 
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on 
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. 
Most of their buys are done in Florida where she leaves 
it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and 
drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off 
in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and 
Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. 
At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk 
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they 
have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement. 
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and 
make their entire living on pushers. 
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make 
a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs deal-
ers, who visit their house often. 
Lance & Susan Gates 
Greenway 
in Condominiums" 
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the 
Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who 
decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of 
the Illinois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license 
had been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated ad-
dress in Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential infor-
mant, whose examination of certain financial records re-
vealed a more recent address for the Gates, and he also 
learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that 
"L. Gates" had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 
245 to West Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chi-
cago on May 5 at 4:15 p.m. 
--
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Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5 
Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader 
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in 
Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and 
take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported 
that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and 
that, at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidenti-
fied woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois li-
cense plates and drove northbound on an interstate fre-
quently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition, 
the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate num-
ber on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon 
owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the 
driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale 
was approximately 22 to 24 hours. 
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, / 9.£)_,. , and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage ;( 
County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The 
j~ge of that court thereupon issued a search warrantJ.or the 
Gates's residence and for their automobile. The judge, in 
deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the 
modus operandi of the Gates had been substantially corrobo-
rated. As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance Gates had 
flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon 
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the 
name of his wife, and, at 7:00a.m. the following morning, had 
headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of 
West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers 
from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a li-
cense plate issued to him. 
At 5:15a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had flown 
out of Chicago, Lance Gates, and his wife, returned to their 
home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left 
West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale 
police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mer-
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cury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. 
A search of the Gates's home revealed marijuana, weapons, 
and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered 
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affida-
vit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the neces-
sary determination of probable cause to believe that the 
Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in 
question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois 
Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court 
of Illinois. 
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded-and we are inclined 
to~ee-that standin aiOne,the anon ous letter sent to 
the Bloomingdale Police Department WQuld not prg.,vide the 
basis for a magistrate's determination that there was proba-
ble cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates's 
car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from 
which one might conclude that its author is either honest or 
his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely 
no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regard-
ing the Gates's criminal activities. Something more was re-
quired, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there 
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be 
found in the Gates's home and car. See Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 
290 u. s. 41 (1933). 
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that 
Detective Mader's affidavit r@ght b~f s~ment­
in~ter with information Sl:iffiCleilt toper-
mit a determination of probable cause. See Whitely v. War-
den, 401 U. S. 560, 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit 
in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sus-
tain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court ap-
plied-a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in 
(_____ S:);;l!!J. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 3 The Illinois 
sIn Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. Spinelli going to and from a 
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Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood 
Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each 
of two independent requirements before it could be relied on. 
J. A., at 5. According to this view, the letter, as sup le-
mented by Mader's affidavit, first had to equate reveal _A' 
the "basis of knowledge" of the letter writer-t e particular 
means by which he came by the information given in his re-
port. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing 
either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alterna-
tively, the "reliability" of the informant's report in this par-
ticular case. 
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules 
that have developed among various lower courts to enforce 
the "two-pronged test," 4 found that the test had not been 
particular apartment, which the telephone company said contained two 
telephones with stated numbers. The officers also were "informed by a 
confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal 
gambling activities]" at the apartment, and that he used two phones, with 
numbers corresponding to those possessed by the police. The officers sub-
mitted an affidavit with this information to a magistrate and obtained a 
warrant to search Spinelli's apartment. We held that the magistrate could 
have made his determination of probable cause only by "abdicating his con-
stitutional function," id., at 416. The Government's affidavit contained 
absolutely no information regarding the informant's reliability. Thus, it 
did not satisfy Aguilar's requirement that such affidavits contain "some 
of the underlying circumstances" indicating that "the informant . . . was 
'credible"' or that "his information [was] 'reliable."' Aguilar, supra, 378 
U. S., at 114. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy Aguilar's requirement 
that it detail "some of the underlying circumstances from which the infor-
mant concluded that : .. narcotics were where he claimed they were. We 
also held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained "sufficient de-
tail" to permit the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on some-
thing more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or 
an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 393 
U. S., at 416, then he properly could have relied on it; we thought, how-
ever, that the tip lacked the requisite detail to permit this "self-verifying 
detail" analysis. 
• See, e. g., Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847 (Md. App. 1974). In sum-
mary, these rules posit that the "veracity" prong of the Spinelli test has 
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satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied be-
cause, "there was simply no basis [for] ... conclud[ing] that 
the anonymous person [that wrote the letter to the 
Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible." J. A., at 
7a. The court indicated that corroboration by police of de-
tails contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" 
prong, and in any event, could not do so if, as in the present 
case, only "innocent" details are corroborated. J. A., at 12. 
In addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its 
writer's knowledge of the Gates's activities. The Illinois 
court understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained 
in a tip to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable 
basis for his statements, but it thought that the anonymous 
letter failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an in-
ference. Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable 
cause had been made. 
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an infor-
mant~ty," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are -----
two "spurs"-the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his in-
formation. Various interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the 
"reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong. Both the "basis of knowledge" 
prong and the "veracity" prong are treated as entirely separate require-
ments, which must be independently satisfied in every case in order to sus-
tain a determination of probable cause. See n. 5, infra. Some ancillary 
doctrines are relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing requirements. 
For example, the "self-verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis of 
knowledge" requirement, although not the "credibility" spur of the "verac-
ity" prong. See J. A. lOa. Conversely, corroboration would seem not ca-
pable of supporting the "basis of knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity" 
prong. I d., at 12a. 
The decision in Stanley, while expressly approving and conscientiously 
attempting to apply the "two-pronged test" observes that "[t]he built-in 
subtleties [of the test] are such, however, that a slipshod application calls 
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 313 A. 2d, at 860 (footnote 
omitted)." The decision also suggested that it is necessary "to evolve 
analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules employed in trial settings] for the 
reception of hearsay in a probable cause setting." I d., at 857. 
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hi hly r:elevant in determining the value of his report. 
o not agree, however, that these elements should be un-
derstood as entirely separate and independent requirements 
to be rigidly exacted in every case, 5 which the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed 
below, they should be understood simply as closely inter-
twined issues that may usefully illuminate the common-
sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to 
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular 
place. 
III 
5 The entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have as-
sumed is indicated both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in this 
case, and by decisions of other courts. One frequently cited decision, 
Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), remarks that "the 
dual requirements represented by the 'two-pronged test' are 'analytically 
severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for 
a deficit on the other prong." See also n. 9, infra. 
6 Our original phrasing of the so-called "two-pronged test" in Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1969), suggests that the two prongs were intended 
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause, 
not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case. In 
Aguilar, we required only that: 
the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances 
from which the informant concluded that ... narcotics were where he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which 
the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his informa-
tion 'reliable."' Id., at 114 (emphasis added). 
As our language indicates, we intended neither a rigid compartmentaliza-
tion of the inquiries into an informant's "veracity," "reliability'' and "basis 
of knowledge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an infor-
mant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two par-
ticular issues be provided to the magistrate. Our decision in Jaben v. 
United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), demonstrated this latter point. We 
held there that a criminal complaint showed probable cause to believe the 
defendant had attempted to evade the payment of income taxes. We com-
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any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every 
informant's tip. Perhaps the c·entral teaching of our deci-
sions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a 
"practical, nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). "In dealing with probable 
cause, ... as the very name implies, wedeafwffi1prohabil-
ities. These are not technical; they are the factual andprac-
tical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." I d., at 175. Our 
observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 
(1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable 
to the probable cause standard: 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors 
as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so are 
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus 
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of li-
brary analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement. 
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid con-
cept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in 
mented that: 
"Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some 
degree of reliability upon the credibility of the source. . . . Nor does it 
indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be 
independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed 
to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. . . . It simply requires 
that enough information be presented to the Comissioner to enable him to 
make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently 
supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal 
process ." Id., at 224-225 (emphasis added). 
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many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons. 
As we said in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972), 
"Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to 
a policeman on the scene may vary greatly in their value and 
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such 
diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation." 
lbid. 7 
7 The diversity of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the total-
ity of the circumstances approach to probable cause, is reflected in our 
prior decisions on the subject. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 
271 (1960), we held that probable cause to search petitioners' apartment 
was established by an affidavit based principally on an informant's tip. 
The unnamed informant claimed to have purchased narcotics from petition-
ers at their apartment; the affiant stated that he had been given correct 
information from the informant on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that 
petitioners had admitted to police officers on another occasion that they 
were narcotics users, sufficed to support the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause. 
Likewise, in Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964), we up-
held a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe 
that certain stolen property would be found in petitioner's apartment. 
The affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that certain furs had been 
stolen, and that a confidential informant, who previously had furnished 
confidential information, said that he saw the furs in petititoner's home. 
Moreover, another confidential informant, also claimed to be reliable, 
stated that one Schweihs had stolen the furs. Police reports indicated that 
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' company and a third informant 
stated that petitioner was a fence for Schweihs. 
Finally, in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), we held that informa-
tion within the knowledge of officers who searched the Ker's apartment 
provided them with probable cause to believe drugs would be found there. 
The officers were aware that one Murphy had previously sold marijuana to 
a police officer; the transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to which 
Murphy had led the police. The night after this transaction, police Ker 
and Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy approached Ker's car, 
and, although police could see nothing change hands, Murphy's modus 
operandi was identical to what it had been the night before. Moreover, 
when police followed Ker from the scene of the meeting with Murphy he 
managed to lose them after performing an abrupt U-turn. Finally, the po-
lice had a statement from an informant who had provided reliable informa-
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Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two 
largely independent channels-the informant's "veracity" or 
"reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5 
supra. There are persuasive arguments against according 
these two elements such independent status. Instead, they 
are better understood as relevant considerations in the total-
ity of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided 
probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be 
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a 
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other 
indicia of reliability. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra, 
407 U. S., at 146-147; Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573 
(1971). 
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the un-
usual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal 
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thor-
oughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not 
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based 
on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F. 2d 37 (CA5 
1973). 8 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes 
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabri-
cated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found 
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. 
Adams v. Williams, supra. Conversely, even if we enter-
tain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and 
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a 
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles 
tion previously, that Ker was engaged in selling marijuana, and that his 
source was Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this coincidence of 
information was sufficient to support a reasonable belief of the officers that 
Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana is to indulge in understate-
ment." !d., at 36. 
8 Compare Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), reason-
ing that "Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge 
still may not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted 
police-affiant." 
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his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. 
Unlike a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a 
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various 
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an infor-
mant's tip, the "two-pronged test" has encouraged an exces-
sively technical dissection of informants' tips/ with undue at-
tention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly 
be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate. 
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348 
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related 
context, that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its 
9 Some lower court decisions, brought to our attention by the State, re-
flect a rigid application of such rules. In Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the affiant had received a confession of armed rob-
bery from one of two suspects in the robbery; in addition, the suspect had 
given the officer $800 in cash stolen during the robbery. The suspect also 
told the officer that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in the other 
suspect's apartment. A warrant issued on the basis of this was invali-
dated on the ground that the affidavit did not satisfactorily describe how 
the accomplice had obtained his information regarding the gun. 
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), the 
affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant stated 
that an informant of proven and uncontested reliability had seen, in specifi-
cally described premises, "a quantity of a white crystalline substance which 
was represented to the informant by a white male occupant of the premises 
to be cocaine. Informant has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in 
the past and is thoroughly familiar with its appearance. The informant 
states that the white crystalline powder he observed in the above de-
scribed premises appeared to him to be cocaine." The warrant issued on 
the basis of the affidavit was invalidated because "There is no indication as 
to how the informant or for that matter any other person could tell whether 
a white substance was cocaine and not some other substance such as sugar 
or salt." Id., at 689. 
Finally, in People v. Brethauer, 482 P. 2d 369 (Colo. 1971), an informant, 
stated to have supplied reliable information in the past, claimed that 
L. S. D. and marijuana were located on certain premises. The affiant 
supplied police with drugs, which were tested by police and confirmed to be 
illegal substances. The affidavit setting forth these, and other, facts was 
found defective under both prongs of Spinelli. 
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usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would jus-
tify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure made under 
circumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we 
said that "the quanta . . . of proof'' appropriate in ordinary 
judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a 
warrant. Brinegar, supra, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely-tuned 
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have 
no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix 
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty cor-
responding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is 
clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie show-
ing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause." 
Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. See Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Pro~ft 
1972). ___, 
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specific-
ity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper 
place in this area." Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108. 
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued I 
by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who cer-
tainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the 
nature of"probable cause." See Shadwick v. City ofTampa, 
407 U. S. 345, 348-350 (1972). The rigorous inquiry into the 
Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of eviden-
tiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our 
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that 
many warrants are-quite properly, ibid.-issued on the 
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen ap-
plying a standard less demanding than those used in more 
formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the context in 
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v. 
State, 313 A. 2d 847, 860 (Md. App. 1974), of the "two-
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pronged test" are particularly troubling. 
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scru-
tiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take 
the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination 
of probable cause should be paid great deference by review-
ing courts." Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. "A grudg-
ing or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward war-
rants," Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108, is inconsistent 
with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant: "courts should not in-
validate . . . warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." ld., 
at 109. 
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected 
to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, 
police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the 
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the 
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search. 
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conduct-
ing an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of un-
lawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual 
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority 
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of 
his power to search." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 
1, 9 (1977). R~ this preference for the warrant m:_oc-
ess, the traditional standard for review of an issuin magis-
trate's pro .2 e cause e ermination has been that so long as 
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" 
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the 
Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United 
States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (1960). See United States v. Har-
ris, 403 U. S. 573, 577-583 (1971). 10 We think reaffirmation 
10 We also have said that "Although in a particular caee it may not be 
easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of proba-
ble cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should 
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of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging re-
course to the warrant procedure and is more consistent with 
our traditional deference to the probable cause determina-
tions of magistrates than is the "two-pronged test." 
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli 
poorly serves "the most basic function of any government": 
"to provide for the security of the individual and of his prop-
erty." "Without the reasonably effective performance of the 
task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle 
to talk about human dignity and civilized values." Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged 
test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforce-
ment, see, e. g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme 
Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously ap-
plied in every case, anonymous tips seldom would be of any 
value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary wit-
nesses, see Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Com-
mittee Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive recita-
tions of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise, 
as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the ve-
racity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis 
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous 
tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of 
the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when sup-
plemented by independent police investigation, frequently 
contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect crimes." 
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants," 
Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S. 1 at 109. This reflects both a desire to encour-
age use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once 
a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. Even 
if we were to accept the premise that the accurate assessment of probable 
cause would be furthered by the "two-pronged test," which we do not, 
these Fourth Amendment policies would require a less rigorous standard 
than that which appears to have been read into Aguilar and Spinelli. 
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While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting 
such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard 
that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen infor-
mants is not. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to aban-
don the "two-m:o%e~),est" establisliea 6y our dec1s1ons in 
Aguilar and Spinel i. 1 ~n its place we reaffirm the totality 
of the circumstan.ses analysis that traditionally lias informed 
probable cause determinations. See Jones v. United States, 
supra; United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United 
States, supra. The task of the issuin rna ·stra e is simply 
to make a ractical, common-sense decision whether, given . 
all the circumstances set orth m the affidavit before him, in-
cluding the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure 
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud-
[ing]" that probable cause existed. Jones v. United States, 
supra, 362 U. S., at 271. We are convinced that this fiexi-
11 The Court's decision in Spinelli has been the subject of considerable 
criticism, both by members of this Court and others. Justice BLACKMUN, 
concurring in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 58fr-586 (1971), noted 
his long-held view "that Spinelli ... was wrongly decided" by this Court. 
Justice Black similarly would have overruled that decision. Ibid. Like-
wise, a noted commentator has observed that "[t]he Aguilar-Spinelli for-
mulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." 8A Moore's Fed-
eral Practice ~ 41.04 (1981). 
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would, 
under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause, 
we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables 
in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a use-
ful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way 
abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the 
principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of 
probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of its 
language. 
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ble, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommo-
dation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires than does the approach that has developed 
from Aguilar and Spinelli. 
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a mag-
istrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn 
statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does 
believe that" liquor illegally brought into the United States is 
located on certain premises will not do. Nathanson v. 
United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must pro-
vide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining 
the existence of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory 
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this require-
ment. An officer's statement that "affiants have received 
reliable information from a credible person and believe" that 
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a 
mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtu-
ally no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable 
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the mag-
istrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his 
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which 
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare 
bones" affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and 
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed 
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli. 
Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard articulated in 
Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 
IV 
Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analy-
81-430-0PINION 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 25 
sis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of 
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent 
police work. In Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 
269, we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be 
deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial 
basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to 
say that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may 
rely upon information received through an informant, rather 
than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's 
statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters 
within the officer's knowledge." Ibid. Likewise, we recog-
nized the -erobative value of corroborative efforts of~e of-
ficials in Aguilar the sourceortlle "two-pronged test"-by 
observing that if the police had made some effort to corrobo-
rate the informant's report at issue, "an entirel~ different 
case" would have been presented. Agutrar: supra, 378 
U. S., at 109, n. 1. 
Our decision in ~er v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959), however, is the classic case on the value of corrobora-
tive efforts of police officrals. There, an lnforman( named 
Here~raper would arrive in Denver on a 
train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be 
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a 
fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted 
that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown 
slacks and black shoes, and would be walking "real fast." 
/d., at 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his 
information. '2 
12 The tip in Draper might well not have survived the rigid application of 
the "two-pronged test" that developed following Spinelli. The only refer-
ence to Hereford's reliability was that he had "been engaged as a 'special 
employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and 
from time to time gave infomation to [the police] for small sums of money, 
and that [the officer] had alwys found the information given by Hereford to 
be accurate and reliable." 358 U. S., at 309. Likewise, the tip gave no 
indication of how Draper came by his information. At most, the detailed 
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On one of the stated dates police officers observed a man 
matching this description exit a train arriving from Chicago; 
his attire and luggage matched Hereford's report and he was 
walking rapidly. We explained in Draper that, by this point 
in his investigation, the arresting officer "had personally ver-
ified every facet of the information given him by Hereford ex-
cept whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had 
the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And 
surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information be-
ing thus personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable 
grounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Here-
ford's information-that Draper would have the heroin with 
him-was likewise true," id., at 313. 
The showing of probable cause in the present case was. fully 
as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing alone, the 
facts obtained through the indep~ n of 
Mader and the EA at east suggested that the Gates were 
inv~~ng. In aod1tlon to oeing a popular 
vacatiOn site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics 
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA, 
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the 
U. S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources 10 
(1979). Lance Gates's flight to Palm Beach, his brief, over-
night stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north 
to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in 
West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug 
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip. 
In addition, the magistrate could rely on the anonymous 
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by_Mader's 
efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 13 The Supreme 
and accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, however Hereford ob-
tained his information, it was reliable. 
'
3 The Illinois Supreme Court thought that the verification of details con-
tained in the anonymous letter in this case amounted only to "the corrobo-
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Court of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an informant 
who had given reliable information on previous occasions, 
while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant 
in this case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police. 
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time the po-
lice department received the anonymous letter, it became far 
less significant after Mader's independent investigative work 
occurred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that 
the Gates's car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would 
fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive 
the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not 
with certainty, that the informant's other assertions also 
were true. "Because an informant is right about some 
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli, 
supra, 393 U. S., at 427 (WHITE, J., concurring}-including 
the claim regarding the Gates's illegal activity. This may 
well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to 
ration of innocent activity," J . A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to sup-
port a finding of probable cause. We are inclined to agree, however, with 
the observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that "In this 
case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in 
the light of the initial tip." J. A. 18a. And it bears noting that all of the 
corroborating detail established in Draper, supra, was of entirely innocent 
activity-a fact later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. United 
States, 362 U. S. 257, 269-270 (1960), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 
36 (1963). 
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed previously, probable cause 
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an 
actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent be-
havior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to 
require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigor-
ous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands. 
We think the Illinois court attempted a too rigid classification of the types 
of conduct that may be relied upon in seeking to demonstrate probable 
cause. See Brown v. Texas , 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979). In making a 
determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether par-
ticular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that 
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts. 
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satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we 
think it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment 
called for in making a probable cause determination. It is 
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 
"corroboration through other sources of information reduced 
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus provid-
ing "a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. 
United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 269, 271. 
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details 
relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions exist-
ing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties 
ordinarily not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate 
information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of 
a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves, 
or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary 
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate in-
formation of this type a magistrate could properly conclude 
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable in-
formation of the Gates's alleged illegal activities. Of course, 
the Gates's travel plans might have been learned from a talk-
ative neighbor or travel agent; under the "two-pronged test" 
developed from Spinelli, the character of the details in the 
anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear 
inference regarding the letter writer's "basis of knowledge." 
But, as discussed previously, supra, --, probable cause 
does not demand the certainty we associate with formal tri-
als. It is enough that there was a fair probability that the 
writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his entire story 
either from the Gates or someone they trusted. And 
corroboration of major portions of the letter's predictions 
provides just this probability. It is apparent, therefore, that 
the judge issuing the warrant had a "substantial basis for . . . 
conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search the Gates's home 
and car existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illi-
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The fact that Lance and Sue Gates made a 22-hour non-
stop drive from West Palm Beach, Florida, to Bloomingdale, 
Illinois, only a few hours after Lance had flown to Florida 
provided persuasive evidence that they were engaged in il-
licit activity. That fact, however, was not known to the 
magistrate when he issued the warrant to search their home. 
What the magistrate did know at that time was that the 
anonymous informant had not been completely accurate in his 
or her predictions. The informant had indicated that "Sue 
drives their· car to Florida where she leaves it to be loaded up 
with drugs . . . . Sue flies back after she drops the car off in 
Florida." App. la (emphasis added). Yet Detective 
Mader's affidavit reported that she "left the West Palm 
Beach area driving the Mercury northbound." App. 12a. 
The discrepancy between the informant's predictions and 
the facts known to Detective Mader is significant for three 
reasons. First, it cast doubt on the informant's hypothesis 
that the Gates already had "over $100,000 worth of drugs in 
their basement," App. la. The informant had predicted an 
itinerary that always kept one spouse in Bloomingdale, sug-
gesting that the Gates did not want to leave their home un-
guarded because something valuable was hidden within. 
That inference obviously could not be drawn when it was 
known that the pair was actually together over a thousand 
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miles from home. 
Second, the discrepancy made the Gates' conduct seem 
substantially less unusual than the informant had predicted it 
would be. It would have been odd if, as predicted, Sue had 
driven down to Florida on Wednesday, left the car, and flown 
right back to Illinois. But the mere facts that Sue was in 
West Palm Beach with the car/ that she was joined by her 
husband at the Holiday Inn on Friday, 2 and that the couple 
drove north together the next morning-1 are not probative of 
any unusual behavior at all. 
Third, the fact that the anonymous letter contained a mate-
rial mistake undermines the reasonableness of relying on it as 
a basis for making a forcible entry into a private home. 
Of course, the activities in this case did not stop when the 
magistrate issued the warrant. The Gates drove all night to 
1 The anonymous note suggested that she was going down on W ednes-
day, App. 1a, but for all the officers knew she had been in Florida for a 
month. App. 10b-13b. 
2 Lance does not appear to have behaved suspiciously in flying down to 
Florida. He made a reservation in his own name and gave an accurate 
home phone number to the airlines. Compare Florida v. Royer, --
U. S. --, --, n. 2 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 
548 (1980) (Stewart, J . , announcing the judgment). And Detective 
Mader's affidavit does not report that he did any of the other things drug 
couriers are notorious for doing, such as paying for the ticket in cash, 
Royer, supra, at --, n. 2, dressing casually, ibid., looking pale and ner-
vous , ibid.; Mendenhall, supra, at 548, improperly filling out baggage 
tags, Royer, supra, at --, n. 2, carrying American Tourister luggage, 
ibid., not carrying any luggage, Mendenhall, supra, at 564-565 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring in part and- concurring in the judgment), or changing 
airlines en route, ibid. 
8 Detective Mader's affidavit hinted darkly that the couple had set out 
upon "that interstate highway commonly used by travelers to the Chicago 
area. " But the same highway is also commonly used by travelers to Dis-
ney World, Sea World, and Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Cir-
cus World. It is also the road to Cocoa Beach, Cape Canaveral, and Wash-
ington, D.C. I would venture that each year dozens of perfectly innocent 
people fly to Florida, meet a waiting spouse, and drive off together in the 
family car. 
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Bloomingdale, the officers searched the car and found 400 
pounds of marijuana, and then they searched the house. 4 
However, none of these subsequent events may be consid-
ered in evaluating the warrant, 5 and the search of the house 
was legal only if the warrant was valid. Vale v. Louisiana, 
399 U. S. 30, 33-35 (1970). I cannot accept the Court's ca-
sual conclusion that, before the Gates arrived in Blooming-
dale, there was prob~ble cause to justify a valid entry and 
search of a private home. No one knows who the informant 
in this case was, or what motivated him or her to write the 
note. Given that the note's predictions were faulty in one 
significant respect, and were corroborated by nothing except 
ordinary innocent activity, I must surmise that the Court's 
evaluation of the warrant's validity has been colored by sub-
sequent events. 6 
Although the foregoing analysis is determinative as to the 
• The officers did not enter the unoccupied house as soon as the warrant 
issued; instead, they waited until the Gates returned. It is unclear 
whether they waited because they wanted to execute the warrant without 
unnecessary property damage or because they had doubts about whether 
the informant's tip was really valid. In either event their judgment is to 
be commended. 
• It is a truism that "a search warrant is valid only if probable cause has 
been shown to the magistrate and that an inadequate showing may not be 
rescued by post-search testimony on information known to the searching 
officers at the time of the search." Rice v. Wolff, 513 F . 2d 1280 (CA8 
1975). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 450-451 (1971); 
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 565, n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-498 
(1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486 (1958); Taylor v. 
United States , 286 U. S. 1, 6 (1932); Agnello v. United States , 269 U. S. 
20, 33 (1925). 
6 Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), affords no support for 
today's holding. That case did not involve an anonymous informant. On 
the contrary, as the Court twice noted, Mr. Hereford was "employed for 
that purpose and [his] information had always been found accurate and reli-
able." Id., at 313; see id., at 309. In this case, the police had no prior 
experience with the informant, and some of his or her information in this 
case was unreliable and inaccurate. 
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house search, the car search raises additional issues because 
"there is a constitutional difference between houses and 
cars." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). Cf. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 589-590 (1980). An offi-
cer who has probable cause to suspect that a highly movable 
automobile contains contraband does not need a valid war-
rant in order to search it. This point was developed in our 
opinion in United States v. Ross, -- U. S. -- (1982), 
which was not decided until after the Illinois Supreme Court 
rendered its decision in this case. Under Ross, the car 
search may have been valid if the officers had probable cause 
after the Gates arrived. 
In apologizing for its belated realization that we should not 
have ordered reargument in this case, the Court today shows 
high regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to 
state courts. Ante, at 6. When the Court discusses the 
merits, however, it attaches no weight to the conclusions of 
the Circuit Judge of DuPage County, Illinois, of the three 
judges of the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court, · 
or of the five justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, all of 
whom concluded that the warrant was not based on probable 
cause. In a fact-bound inquiry of this sort, the judgment of 
three levels of state courts, all of whom are better able to 
evaluate the probable reliability of anonymous informants in 
Bloomingdale, Illinois, than we are, should be entitled to at 
least a presumption of accuracy. 7 I would simply vacate the 
7 The Court holds that what were heretofore considered two independ-
ent "prongs"-"veracity" and "basis of knowledge"-are now to be consid-
ered together as circumstances whose totality must be appraised. A nte, 
at 18. "A deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the 
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some 
other indicia of reliability." Ibid. Yet in this case, the lower courts found 
neither factor present. App. 12a. And the supposed "other indicia" in 
the affidavit take the form of activity that is not particularly remarkable. 
I do not understand how the Court can find that the "totality'' so far ex-
ceeds the sum of its "circumstances." 
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judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remand the case 
for reconsideration in the light of our intervening decision in 
United States v. Ross. 
• 
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for vi-
olation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a 
search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraban 
in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gate ' 
moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state 
courts granting the motion. It held that the affidavit sub-
mitted in support of the State's application for a warrant to 
search the Gates's property was inadequate under this 
Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) 
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a search 
warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous 
informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral ar-
gument on this question, however, we requested the parties 
to address an additional question: 
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal 
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any ex-
tent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the 
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief 
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that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment." 
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we 
framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois courts 
and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the 
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, 
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the re-
quirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restric-
tively. Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not 
addressing the question regarding modification of the ex-
clusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982, 
-U.S.-. 
I 
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state courts 
derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides that "Final 
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a 
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court as follows: ... (3) By writ of certiorari, 
... where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially 
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes 
of ... the United States." The provision derives, albeit 
with important alterations, see, e. g., Act of December 23, 
1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 
929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85. 
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of 
§ 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in some re-
spects not entirely clear. We held early on that § 25 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no jurisdiction unless 
a federal question had been both raised and decided in the 
state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v. 
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 391 (1836), "If both of these require-
ments do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction 
fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch. 344 
(1809). 1 
1 The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, supra, that a federal claim 
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More recently, in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309 
U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), the Court observed: 
But it is also the settled practice of this Court, in the ex-
ercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it is only in excep-
tional cases, and then only in cases coming from the fed-
eral courts, that it considers questions urged by a 
petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the 
courts below. . . . In cases coming here from state 
courts in which a state statute is assailed as unconstitu-
tional, there are reasons of peculiar force which should 
lead us to refrain from deciding questions not presented 
or decided in the highest court of the state whose judicial 
action we are called upon to review. Apart from there-
luctance with which every court should proceed to set 
aside legislation as unconstitutional on grounds not prop-
erly presented, due regard for the appropriate relation-
ship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to 
consider and decide questions affecting the validity of 
state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for 
these reasons that this Court, where the constitutional-
ity of a statute has been upheld in the state court, con-
sistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not 
raised or decided in that court. 
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional char-
acter of the rule against our deciding claims "not pressed nor 
passed upon" in state court in State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 160 (1945), where 
have been both raised and addressed in state court was generally not un-
derstood in the literal fashion in which it was phrased. See R. Robertson 
& F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 60 
(1951). Instead, the Court developed the rule that a claim would not be 
considered here unless it had been either raised or squarely considered and 
resolved in state court. See, e. g., McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generate, 
309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940); State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Duel, 
324 u. s. 154, 160 (1945). 
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we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme Court did not 
pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v. 
California, 401 U. S. 797, 805--806 (1971). 
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our 
more recent cases have treated the so-called "not pressed or 
passed upon below" rule as merely a prudential restriction. 
In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949), the Court re-
versed a state criminal conviction on a ground not urged in 
state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v. 
New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily 
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not raised 
in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court indicated in a footnote, id., at 479, n. 3, that it pos-
sessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court 
the question on which it decided the case. 
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the 
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have recognized 
that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal 
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon 
below. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198 
(1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said 
that "if the question were only an enlargement of the one 
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so con-
nected with it in substance as to form but another ground or 
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judg-
ment, we should have no hesitation in holding the assignment 
sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued. 
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which 
were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal question 
there discussed." 2 We have not attempted, and likely 
2 In Dewey, certain assessments had been levied against the owner of 
property abutting a street paved by the city; a state trial court ordered 
that the property be forfeited when the assessments were not paid, and in 
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would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between 
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented 
below and those involving entirely new questions. 
The application of these principles in the instant case is not 
entirely straightforward. It is clear in this case that re-
spondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judi-
cial system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been 
violated by the actions of the Illinois police and that the evi-
dence seized by the officers should be excluded from their 
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level 
of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the sub-
stantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been 
violated. The State never, however, raised or addressed 
the question whether the federal exclusionary rule should 
be modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the 
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was 
considered. 
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a 
writ of certiorari. Since the Act of December 23, 1914, c. 2, 
38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court to re-
view state court decisions even when a claimed federal right 
has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting the "not 
pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, in-
volved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or 
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we 
addition, held appellant personally liable for the amount by which the as-
sessments exceeded the value of the lots. In state court the appellant ar-
gued that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not re-
ceived personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, he 
also attempted to argue that the assessment itself constituted a taking 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, beyond arising 
from a single factual occurrence, the two claims "are not in anywise neces-
sarily connected," id., at 198. Because of this, we concluded that appel-
lant's taking claim could not be considered. 
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can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have chal-
lenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure 
of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim. 
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not 
pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, these are as 
applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion 
of a particular federal right, as to a party's failure to have as-
serted the claim. First, "questions not raised below are 
those on which the record is very likely to be inadequate 
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in 
mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969). 
Exactly the same difficulty exists when the state urges moQ.l.:o· - --~ 
fication of an existing constitutional right or panying 
remedy. Here, for exam contains little, if 
anything, regarding th subjectiv good faith of the police of-
ficers that searched the ' roperty-which might well 
be an important consideration in fashioning a good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of the 
modification of the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit 
from a record containing such facts. 
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of 
this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie 
Generale, 309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), demands that those 
courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutional-
ity of the actions of state officials, and, equally important, 
proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional 
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to 
the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be 
modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the 
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an ade-
quate and independent state ground. See Cardinale, supra, 
394 U. S., at 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclu-
sionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp, 138 
N. E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view even if it 
thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be 
modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to 
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hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal 
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a 
well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or 
passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier deci-
sions indicate, see --, supra, or prudential, as several of 
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character might 1 
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhert!) 
w~ not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may 
be, conSRteratlon of the question presented in our order of 
November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifica-
tions for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we 
thus decide not to pass on the issue. 
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the 
federal exclusionary rule-suppressing evidence against re-
spondents-does not affect our conclusion. In Morris on v. 
Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to con-
sider whether a state statute impaired the appellant's con-
tract with the appellee. It declined to hear the case because 
the question presented here had not been pressed or passed 
on below. The Court acknowledged that the lower court's 
opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier de-
cision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissi-
bly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that 
there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any 
stage of this case upon the point," id., at 115, and that with-
out such a contest, the routine restatement and application of 
settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not 
pressed or passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the 
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal 
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon 
the point. The application of the exclusionary rule was 
merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the 
Illinois courts on the question whether application of a modi-
fied rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In 
such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary 
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to apprise the state court of the arguments for not applying 
the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the question 
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. 
Likewise, we do not believe that the State's repeated oppo-
sition to respondent's substantive Fourth Amendment claims 
suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary 
rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judi~ 
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend 
ment rights generally" and not )'a personal constitutiona 
right of the party aggrieved." VUnited States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). The question whether the exclu-
sionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context 
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the ques-
tion whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party 
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. 
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980); 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); United 
States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 
(1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modi-
fication or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected 
with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at issue] as 
to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalid-
ity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 173 
U. S., at 197-198. Rather, the rule's modification was, for 
purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a 
separate claim that had to be specifically presented to the 
State courts. 
Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against 
our considering the question presented in our order of No-
vember 29, 1983. The extent of the continued vitality of the 
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Suffi-
cient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue 
that members of this Court recently have made, e. g., Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971) 
81-43(}-0PINION 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 9 
(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 502 
(Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
537-539 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U. S. 387, 413-414 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring); Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 437, 443-444 (1981) (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public 
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere 
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion. 
By doing so we "promote respect ... for the Court's adjudi-
catory process [and] the stability of [our] decisions." Mapp 
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U. S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual 
record will be available to us, thereby discouraging the fram-
ing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, 
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In 
Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens the 
threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id., at 676 (Har-
lan, J., dissenting), not foreseen at the time of decision. The 
public importance of our decisions in Weeks and M app and 
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these 
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our custom-
ary procedural rules. By following this course, we promote 
respect for the procedures by which our decisions are ren-
dered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions. 
A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court dictates 
that we reserve for another day the question whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be modified. 
II 
We now turn to the question presented in the State's origi-
nal petition for certiorari, which requires us to decide 
whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments were violated by the search of their car 
and house. A chronological statement of events usefully in-
troduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb 
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of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the 
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anony-
mous handwritten letter which read as follows: 
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in 
your town who strictly make their living on selling 
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on 
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. 
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife 
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be 
loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it 
back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Flor-
ida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance 
will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At 
the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk 
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they 
have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement. 
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and 
make their entire living on pushers. 
I gurut,)ltee if you watch them carefully you will make 
a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs deal-
ers, who visit their house often. 
Lance & Susan Gates 
Greenway 
in Condominiums" 
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloom-
ingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who decided 
to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the Illi-
nois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had 
been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated address 
in Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential informant, 
whose examination of certain financial records revealed a 
more recent address for the Gates, and he also learned from a 
police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that "L. Gates" had 
made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West 
Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 
5 at 4:15 p.m. 
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Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug 
Eiiforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5 
Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader 
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in 
Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and 
take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported 
that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and 
that, at 7:00a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidenti-
fied woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois li-
cense plates and drove northbound on an interstate fre-
quently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition, 
the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate num-
ber on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon 
owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the 
driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale 
was approximately 22 to 24 hours. 
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, 
and subm1 te~ a judg:~ o ~ 1rcm ou o u age 
County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The 
judge of that court thereupon issued a search warrant for the 
Gates's residence and for their automobile. The judge, in r 
deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the 
modus operandi of the Gates had been substantiall co- obo-
rat . s e anonymous e ter predicted, Lance Gates had 
flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon 
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the 
name of his wife, and, at 7:00a.m. the following morning, had 
headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of 
West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers 
from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a li-
cense plate issued to him. 
At 5:15a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hoUJS after he had flown 
out of Chicago, Lance Gates, ana hfs wife, returned to their 
home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left 
West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale 
police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mer-
cury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. 
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A search of the Gates's home revealed marijuana, weapons, 
and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered 
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affida-
vit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the neces-
sary determination of probable cause to believe that the 
Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in 
question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois 
Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court 
of Illinois. 
The Illinois~u ~me-eo~oncluded-and we are inclined 
to agree-th stan din alone{ th~er sent to 
the Bloomingda e -olice Department would noJ J2rovide_the 
basis for a rna "strate's determin tion that there was proba-
ble cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates's 
car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from 
which one might conclude that its author is either honest or 
his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely 
no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regard-
ing the Gates's criminal activities. Something more was re-
quired, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there 
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be 
found in the Gates's home and car. See Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 
290 u. s. 41 (1933). 
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that 
Detective Mader's affidavit might bec apa6Ieof supplement-
ing tfielilionymous Ietter with information sufficient to per-
mitadetermmationof probable cause. See Whitely v. War-
den, 401 U. S. 560, 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit 
in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sus-
tain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court ap-
plied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 3 The Illinois 
3 In Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. Spinelli going to and from a 
particular apartment, which the telephone company said contained two 
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~PTl;!me::::::fYourt, like some others, apparently understood 
Sp elli requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each 
1'11'--hxl'l"' mdependent requirements before it could be relied on. 
J. A., at 5. According to this view, the letter l!_S su le-
mented by Mader's affidavit, first had t;;,-~~ reveal 
the "basis of knowledge" of the letter wr~rticula 
means by which he came by the information given in his re-
port. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing 
either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alterna-
tively, the "reliability" of the informant's report in this par-
ticular case. 
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules 
that have developed among various lower courts to enforce 
the "two-pronged test," 4 found that the test had not been 
telephones with stated numbers. The officers also were "informed by a 
confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal 
gambling activities]" at the apartment, and that he used two phones, with 
numbers corresponding to those possessed by the police. The officers sub-
mitted an affidavit with this information to a magistrate and obtained a 
warrant to search Spinelli's apartment. We held that the magistrate could 
have made his determination of probable cause only by "abdicating his con-
stitutional function," id., at 416. The Government's affidavit contained 
absolutely no information regarding the informant's reliability. Thus, it 
did not satisfy Aguilar's requirement that such affidavits contain "some 
of the underlying circumstances" indicating that "the informant . . . was 
'credible'" or that "his information [was] 'reliable.'" Aguilar, supra, 378 
U. S., at 114. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy Aguilar's requirement 
that it detail "some of the underlying circumstances from which the infor-
mant concluded that ... narcotics were where he claimed they were. We 
also held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained "sufficient detail" 
to permit the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on something 
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an 
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 393 U. S., 
at 416, then he properly could have relied on it; we thought, however, that 
the tip lacked the requisite detail to permit this "self-verifying detail" 
analysis. 
• See, e. g. , Stanley v. State , 313 A. 2d 847 (Md. App. 1974). In sum-
mary, these rules posit that the "veracity" prong of the Spinelli test has 
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satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied be-
cause, "there was simply no basis [for] ... conclud[ing] that 
the anonymous person k\V ho ote the letter to the Blooming-
dale Police Departmentr was credible." J. A., at 7a. The 
court indicated that corroboration by police of details con-
tained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" prong, 
and in any event, could not do so if, as in the present case, 
only "innocent" details are corroborated. J. A., at 12. In 
addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writ-
er's knowledge of the Gates's activities. The Illinois court 
understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip 
to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for 
his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter 
failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference. 
Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable cause had 
been made. 
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an infor-
ma~'s ~eracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge»ire 
two "spurs"-the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his in-
formation. Various interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the 
"reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong. Both the "basis of knowledge" 
prong and the "veracity" prong are treated as entirely separate require-
ments, which must be independently satisfied in every case in order to sus-
tain a determination of probable cause. See n: 5, infra. Some ancillary 
doctrines are relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing requirements. 
For example, the "self-verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis of 
knowledge" requirement, although not the "credibility" spur of the "verac-
ity" prong. See J. A. lOa. Conversely, corroboration would seem not ca-
pable of supporting the "basis of knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity'' 
prong. Id. , at 12a. 
The decision in Stanley, while expressly approving and conscientiously 
attempting to apply the "two-pronged test" observes that "[t]he built-in 
subtleties [of the test] are such, however, that a slipshod application calls 
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 313 A. 2d, at 860 (footnote 
omitted)." The decision also suggested that it is necessary "to evolve 
analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules employed in trial settings] for the 
reception of hearsay in a probable cause setting." I d., at 857. 
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all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. 
W£,do not agree, however, that these elements should be un-
derstood as entirely separate and inde endent re uirements 
to e r1g1 y e ac e m every case, 5 which the opinion of the 
Supreme "Court orTIImois would imply. ..fuill!_er, as detailed 
below, they should be understood simply as closely inter-
twined issues that may usefully illuminate the common-
sen8e,Practical quesbon whether there is "probable cause" to 
bet1eve that co:rlti'a6and or evidence is located in a particular 
place. 
III 
This totality of the circumstances approach is far more con-
~ sis tent with our prior treatment of probable cause 6 than is 
5 The entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have as-
sumed is indicated both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in this 
case, and by decisions of other courts. One frequently cited decision, 
Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), remarks that "the 
dual requirements represented by the 'two-pronged test' are 'analytically 
severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for 
a deficit on the other prong." See also n. 9, infra. 
6 Our original phrasing of the so-called "two-pronged test" in Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1969), suggests that the two prongs were intended 
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause, 
not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case. In 
Aguilar, we required only that: 
the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances 
from which the informant concluded that . . . narcotics were where he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which 
the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his informa-
tion 'reliable.'" !d., at 114 (emphasis added). 
As our language indicates, we intended neither a rigid compartmentaliza-
tion of the inquiries into an informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis 
of knowledge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an infor-
mant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two par-
ticular issues be provided to the magistrate. Our decision in Jaben v. 
United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), demonstrated this latter point. We 
held there that a criminal complaint showed probable cause to believe the 
defendant had attempted to evade the payment of income taxes. We com-
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any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every 
informant's tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our deci-
sions be~ring on the probable cause stan ard is t atjt is a 
"practical, nontechniCal conceRUon.'' iirinegar v. United 
Sta es, , 1 9). "In dealing with probable 
cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabil-
ities. These are not technical; they are the factual and prac-
tical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." I d., at 175. Our 
observation in United States v. G.!l.rtez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 
(1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable 
to the probable cause standard: ' 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors 
as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so are 
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus 
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of li-
brary analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement. 
As these comments illustrate, p~ con-
cept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
fiiCfiial contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in 
mented that: 
"Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some 
degree of reliability upon the credibility of the source. . . . Nor does it 
indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be 
independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed 
to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. . . . It simply requires 
that enough information be presented to the Comissioner to enable him to 
make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently 
supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal 
process." Id., at 224-225 (emphasis added). 
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many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons. 
As we said in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972), 
"Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to 
a policeman on the scene may vary greatly in their value and 
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such 
diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation." 
lbid. 7 
7 The diversity of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the total-
ity of the circumstances approach to probable cause, is reflected in our 
prior decisions on the subject. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 
271 (1960), we held that probable cause to search petitioners' apartment 
was established by an affidavit based principally on an informant's tip. 
The unnamed informant claimed to have purchased narcotics from petition-
ers at their apartment; the affiant stated that he had been given correct 
information from the informant on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that 
petitioners had admitted to police officers on another occasion that they 
were narcotics users, sufficed to support the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause. 
Likewise, in Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964), the Court 
upheld a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to be-
lieve that certain stolen property would be found in petitioner's apartment. 
The affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that certain furs had been 
stolen, and that a confidential informant, who previously had furnished 
confidential information, said that he saw the furs in petititoner's home. 
Moreover, another confidential informant, also claimed to be reliable, 
stated that one Schweihs had stolen the furs. Police reports indicated that 
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' company and a third informant 
stated that petitioner was a fence for Schweihs. 
Finally, in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), we held that informa-
tion within the knowledge of officers who searched the Ker's apartment 
provided them with probable cause to believe drugs would be found there. 
The officers were aware that one Murphy had previously sold marijuana to 
a police officer; the transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to which 
Murphy had led the police. The night after this transaction, police ob-
served Ker and Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy approached 
Ker's car, and, although police could see nothing change hands, Murphy's 
modus operandi was identical to what it had been the night before. More-
over, when police followed Ker from the scene of the meeting with Murphy 
he managed to lose them after performing an abrupt U-turn. Finally, the 
police had a statement from an informant who had provided reliable in-
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Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two 
largely independent channels-the informant's "veracity" or 
"reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5 
supra. There are persuasive arguments against according 
these two elemen ts strch maependenrstatus. Instead", they 
are better unae:fStoo<taS releVant considerations in the total-
ity of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided 
probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be 
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a 
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other 
indicia of reliability. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra, 
407 U. S., at 146-147; Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573 
(1971). 
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the un-
usual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal 
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thor-
oughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not 
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based 
on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F. 2d 37 (CA5 
1973). 8 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes 
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabri-
cated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found 
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. 
Adams v. Williams, supra. Conversely, even if we enter-
tain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and 
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a 
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles ., 
formation previously, that Ker was engaged in selling marijuana, and that 
his source was Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this coincidence 
of information was sufficient to support a reasonable belief of the officers 
that Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana is to indulge in under-
statement." Id., at 36. 
8 Compare Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), reason-
ing that "Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge 
still may not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted 
police-affiant." 
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his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. 
Unlike a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a 
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various 
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an infor-
mant's tip, the "two-pronged test" has encouraged an exces-
sively technical dissection of informants' tips, 9 with undue at-
tention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly 
be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate. 
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348 
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related 
context, that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its 
• Some lower court decisions, brought to our attention by the State, re-
flect a rigid application of such rules. In Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the affiant had received a confession of armed rob-
bery from one of two suspects in the robbery; in addition, the suspect had 
given the officer $800 in cash stolen during the robbery. The suspect also 
told the officer that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in the other 
suspect's apartment. A warrant issued on the basis of this was invali-
dated on the ground that the affidavit did not satisfactorily describe how 
the accomplice had obtained his information regarding the gun. 
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), the 
affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant stated 
that an informant of proven and uncontested reliability had seen, in specifi-
cally described premises, "a quantity of a white crystalline substance which 
was represented to the informant by a white male occupant of the premises 
to be cocaine. Informant has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in 
the past and is thoroughly familiar with its appearance. The informant 
states that the white crystalline powder he observed in the above de-
scribed premises appeared to him to be cocaine." The warrant issued on 
the basis of the affidavit was invalidated because "There is no indication as 
to how the informant or for that matter any other person could tell whether 
a white substance was cocaine and not some other substance such as sugar 
or salt." !d., at 689. 
Finally, in People v. Brethauer, 482 P. 2d 369 (Colo. 1971), an informant, 
stated to have supplied reliable information in the past, claimed that 
L. S. D. and marijuana were located on certain premises. The affiant 
supplied police with drugs, which were tested by police and confirmed to be 
illegal substances. The affidavit setting forth these, and other, facts was 
found defective under both prongs of Spinelli. 
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usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would jus-
tify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure made under 
circumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we 
said that "the quanta ... of proof'' appropriate in ordinary 
judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a 
warrant. Brinegar, supra, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely-tuned 
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have 
no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix 
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty cor-
responding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is 
clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie show-
ing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause." 
Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. See Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Proposed Off. Draft 
1972). 
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specific-
ity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper 
place in this area." Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108. 
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued 
by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who cer-
tainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the 
nature of"probable cause." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 
407 U. S. 345, 348--350 (1972). The rigorous inquiry into the 
Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of eviden-
tiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our 
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that 
many warrants are-quite properly, ibid.-issued on the 
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen ap-
plying a standard less demanding than those used in more 
formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the context in 
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v. 
State, 313 A. 2d 847, 860 (Md. App. 1974), of the "two-
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pronged test" are particularly troubling. 
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scru-
tiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take 
the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination 
of probable cause should be paid great deference by review-
ing courts." Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. "A grudg-
ing or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward war-
rants," Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108, is inconsistent 
with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant: "courts should not in-
validate ... warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." Id., 
at 109. 
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected 
to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, 
police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the 
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the 
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search. 
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conduct-
ing an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of un-
lawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual 
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority 
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of 
his power to search." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 
1, 9 (1977). Reflecting this preference for the warrant proc-
ess, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magis-
trate's probable cause determination has been that so long as 
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]" 
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the 
Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United 
States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (1960). See United States v. Har-
ris, 403 U. S. 573, 577-583 (1971). 10 We think reaffirmation 
10 We also have said that "Although in a particular case it may not be 
easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of proba-
ble cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should 
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of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging re-
course to the warrant procedure and is more consistent with 
our traditional deference to the probable cause determina-
tions of magistrates than is the "two-pronged test." 
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli 
poorly serves "the most basic function of any government": 
"to provide for the security of the individual and of his prop-
erty." "Without the reasonably effective performance of the 
task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle 
to talk about human dignity and civilized values." Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged 
test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforce-
ment, see, e. g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme 
Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously ap-
plied in every case, anonymous tips seldom would be of any 
value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary wit-
nesses, see Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Com-
mittee Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive recita-
tions of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise, 
as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the ve-
racity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis 
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous 
tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of 
the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when sup-
plemented by independent police investigation, frequently 
contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect crimes." 
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants," 
Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 109. This reflects both a desire to encour-
age use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once 
a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. Even 
if we were to accept the premise that the accurate assessment of probable 
cause would be furthered by the "two-pronged test," which we do not, 
these Fourth Amendment policies would require a less rigorous standard 
than that which appears to have been read into Aguilar and Spinelli. 
81-430-0PINION 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 23 
While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting 
such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard 
that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen infor-
mants is not. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that i~~n­
don the "two- ron ed test" established by our decisions in 
Aguilar an Spmelli. 11 n 1 s p e we reaffirm the totality 
of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed 
probable cause determinations. See Jones v. United States, 
supra; United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United 
States, supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, in-
cluding the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons t 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime""W!ll Ee found m a parbcufiir 
Rlace. And the auty of a reVIewmg co\frt 1S S1mpiy to ensure 
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud-
[ing]" that probable cause existed. Jones v. United States, 
supra, 362 U. S., at 271. We are convinced that this fl.exi-
11 The Court's decision in Spinelli has been the subject of considerable 
criticism, both by members of this Court and others. Justice BLACKMUN, 
concurring in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 585--586 (1971), noted 
his long-held view "that Spinelli ... was wrongly decided" by this Court. 
Justice Black similarly would have overruled that decision. Ibid. Like-
wise, a noted commentator has observed that "[t]he Aguilar-Spinelli for-
mulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." 8A Moore's Fed-
eral Practice ~ 41.04 (1981). 
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would, 
under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause, 
we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables 
in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a use-
ful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way 
abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the 
principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of 
probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of its 
language. 
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ble, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommo-
dation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires than does the approach that has developed 
from Aguilar and Spinelli. 
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a mag-
istrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn 
statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does 
believe that" liquor illegally brought into the United States is 
located on certain premises will not do. Nathanson v. 
United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must pro-
vide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining 
the existence of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory 
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this require-
ment. An officer's statement that "affiants have received 
reliable information from a credible person and believe" that 
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a 
mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtu-
ally no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable 
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the mag-
istrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his 
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which 
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare 
bones" affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and 
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed 
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli. 
Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard articulated in 
Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 
IV 
Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analy-
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sis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of 
corroboration of details ofanTri1'ormant's tip by independent 
police work. Tn Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 
269, we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be 
deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial 
basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to 
say that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may 
rely upon information received through an informant, rather 
than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's 
statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters 
within the officer's knowledge." Ibid. Likewise, we recog-
nized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police of-
ficials in Aguilar-the source of the "two-pronged test"-by 
observing that if the police had made some effort to corrobo-
rate the informant's report at issue, "an entirely different 
case" would have been presented. Aguilar, supra, 378 
U. S., at 109, n. 1. 
Our decision in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959), however, is the cfassic case on the value of corrobora-
tive efforts of police officials. There, an informant named 
Hereford reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a 
train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be 
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a 
fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted 
that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown 
slacks and black shoes, and would be walking "real fast." 
!d., at 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his 
information. 12 
12 The tip in Draper might well not have survived the rigid application of 
the "two-pronged test" that developed following Spinelli. The only refer-
ence to Hereford's reliability was that he had "been engaged as a 'special 
employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and 
from time to time gave infomation to [the police] for small sums of money, 
and that [the officer] had alwys found the information given by Hereford to 
be accurate and reliable." 358 U. S., at 309. Likewise, the tip gave no 
indication of how Hereford came by his information. At most, the detailed 1 
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On one of the stated dates police officers observed a man 
matching this description exit a train arriving from Chicago; 
his attire and luggage matched Hereford's report and he was 
walking rapidly. We explained in Draper that, by this point 
in his investigation, the arresting officer "had personally ver-
ified every facet of the information given him by Hereford ex-
cept whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had 
the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And 
surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information be-
ing thus personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable 
grounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Here-
ford's information-that Draper would have the heroin with 
him-was likewise true," id., at 313. I 
The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully 
as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing alone,_!_he 
facts obtained through the independent investi ation of 
Ma er an e a eas sugges e at the Gates were 
involve m rug tra c ng. n ad 1tion to bemg a popular 
vacation site, F'Iorilla is well-known as a source of narcotics 
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA, 
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the 
U. S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources 10 
(1979). Lance Gates's flight to Palm Beach, his brief, over-
night stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north 
to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in I 
West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug ~ 
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip. 0 
In addition, the magistrate could rely on the anonymous 
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by Mader's 
efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 13 The Supreme 
and accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, however Hereford ob-
tained his information, it was reliable. 
13 The Illinois Supreme Court thought that the verification of details con-
tained in the anonymous letter in this case amounted only to "the corrobo-
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Court of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an informant 
who had given reliable information on previous occasions, 
while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant 
in this case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police. 
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time the po-
lice department received the anonymous letter, it became far 
less significant after Mader's independent investigative work 
occurred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that 
the Gates's car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would 
fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive 
the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not 
with certainty, that the informant's other assertions also 
were true. "Because an informant is right about some 
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli, 
supra, 393 U. S., at 427 (WHITE, J., concurring)-including 
the claim regarding the Gates's illegal activity. This may 
well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to 
ration of innocent activity," J. A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to sup-
port a finding of probable cause. We are inclined to agree, however, with 
the observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that "In this 
case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in 
the light of the initial tip." J. A. 18a. And it bears noting that all of the 
corroborating detail established in Draper, supra, was of entirely innocent 
activity-a fact later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. United 
States, 362 U. S. 257, 269-270 (1960), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 
36 (1963). 
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed previously, probable cause 
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an 
actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent be-
havior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to 
require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigor-
ous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands. 
We think the Illinois court attempted a too rigid classification of the types 
of conduct that may be relied upon in seeking to demonstrate probable 
cause. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979). In making a 
determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether par-
ticular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that 
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts. 
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satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we 
think it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment 
called for in making a probable cause determination. It is 
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 
"corroboration through other sources of information reduced 
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus provid-
ing "a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. 
United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 269, 271. 
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details 
relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions exist-
ing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties 
ordinarily not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate 
information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of 
a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves, 
or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary 
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate in-
formation of this type a magistrate could properly conclude 
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable in-
formation of the Gates's alleged illegal activities. 14 Of 
14 The dissent seizes on one inaccuracy in the anonymous informant's let-
ter-its statement that Sue Gates would fly from Florida to Illinois, when 
in fact she drove-and argues that the probative value of the entire tip was 
undermined by this allegedly "material mistake." We have never re-
quired that informants used by the police be infallible, and can see no rea-
son to impose such a requirement in this case. Probable cause, particu-
larly when police have obtained a warrant, simply does not require the 
perfection the dissent finds necessary. Moreover, the character of the in-
formant's "mistake" does little to reduce the reliability of the informant's 
tip. Sue Gates's decision to revise her travel plans is no different from the 
last-minute changes that travellers frequently are wont to make. It 
scarcely is reasonable to require the informant to have predicted this kind 
of change, as well as the other details that he was right about. 
Likewise, there is no force to the dissent's argument that the Gates's ac-
tion in leaving their home unguarded undercut the informant's claim that 
drugs were hidden there. Indeed, the line-by-line scrutiny that the dis-
sent applies to the anonymous letter is akin to that we find inappropriate in 
reviewing magistrate's decisions. The dissent apparently attributes to 
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course, the Gates's travel plans might have been learned 
from a talkative neighbor or travel agent; under the "two-
pronged test" developed from Spinelli, the character of the 
details in the anonymous letter might well not permit a suffi-
ciently clear inference regarding the letter writer's "basis of 
knowledge." But, as discussed previously, supra, --, 
probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate 
with formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair prob-
ability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained 
his entire story either from the Gates or someone they 
trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the letter's 
predictions provides just this probability. It is apparent, 
therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a "substan-
tial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search 
the Gates's home and car existed. The judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois therefore must be 
Reversed. 
the magistrate who issued the warrant in this case the rather implausible 
notion that persons dealing in drugs always stay at home, apparently out of 
fear that to leave might risk intrusion by criminals. If accurate, one could 
not help sympathizing with the self-imposed isolation of people so situated. 
In reality, however, it is scarcely likely that the magistrate ever thought 
that the anonymous tip "kept one spouse" at home, much less that he relied 
on the theory advanced by the dissent. The letter simply says that Sue 
would fly from Florida to Illinois, without indicating whether the Gates's 
made the bitter choice of leaving the drugs in their house, or those in their 
car, unguarded. The magistrate's determination that there might be 
drugs or evidence of criminal activity in the Gates's home was well-sup-
ported by the less speculative theory, noted in text, that if the informant 
could predict with considerable accuracy the somewhat unusual travel 
plans of the Gates, he probably also had a reliable basis for his statements 
that the Gates's kept a large quantity of drugs in their home and frequently 
were visited by other drug traffickers there. 
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We don't like ·it ·when the police en-
gage in warrantless _ raids, unjustified · 
searches or stationhouse beatings-
' -even if such official lawlessness prO-
duces solid evidence of criminality. We 
· don't like it when an obviously guilty 
- felon is let go because of some techni-
,_. cal flaw in the way the evidence against 
·him was obtained. - · -- - -- - · -
As a result, most of us are of two 
minds concerning the judicial principle 
that makes illegally obtained evidence · 
inadmissible in court. That two-mind-
edness apparently extends all the ~ay 
·- to the U.S. Supreme 'Court, which has 
agreed to take a sec'ond look at a case -
·- in which a bad \\'arrant turned up good 
evidence. The fact that the court Will 
:' take up ipe Ca.se again ·sugges~ that it _ 
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_. _-: the vexing question of the. "exclusjon-
. · ary rule." · -- ~ · ·. ·. · ·. · · ·.·I 
The rule;~ known a5 the -suppres-
sion doctrine, bas applied to federal . 
criminal ·cases since a 1914 .Supreme 
Court -decision. In a l961 ruling, it was 
extended to state cases. ·Jts rationale is 
clear enough: that law enforcement offi-
cer.; should not be rewarded ( .... ~th ron-
\ictions} for violating the Fourth 
Amendment guarantee against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures ·or the 
Fifth Amendment right of a suspect not 
to be required to te:,-tify against hlmself. 
The rule seems reasonable In some 
· cases. if an officer raids your home-on 
a u·him and finds evidence of criminal 
:-- . acti\ity; if the police st..op .You on the 
-. street and search you because they 
·- don't like your attitude; if they suspect 
• _ that you have been involved in a crime 
and proceed to ~rture·· you until you 
point them to · the evidence they 
weren't able to discover on their own, .. · 
-· you'd likely think it wrong tha~ they · 
should be able to use the evidence 
against you in court-e\·en if it turned 
. out to be reliable e\idence. . · 
· But suppose the officer was acting in l 
I 
good faith and didn't know that the 
e\idence was unlawfully obtained until 
the Supreme Court, perhaps in a split 
decision, told him so. Should the ap-
. parently guilty suspect be declared in-
nocent? · - · . ·' - : · · - · •· s 
. That is pretty muc what happene<l • 
in llinois u. Gates e 1978 case the ' 
co agreed I ·eek to rehear. Police 
0 B · n, IlL, got an anonymous :- .. 
t1p that Lance and Sue Gates - were · 
preparing to make a major narcotics 
deal in Florida The officers checked ' 
the ~nformation, ronfirmed part of it, · 
__ ,, obtained a search warrant arid raided 
. .-' the couple's h~me. There -they alleg-
- ~ly found weapons, drug paraphema--
4 lia, a quantity of cocaine and · 350 
pounds of r;oarijuana. The illinms court 
barred the evidence on the ground that , . 
the warrant had "been obtained on in-· -
s~ficient grounds-the anonymous -
tJp. The state appealed the case ar- -
_guing that the police were acting i~ the 
g~-fait~ belief that the warrant was 
\'alJd. The Sup~eme Co\-111, which first 
p~sh~ _that argument aside,_now sa.Ys 
1t 1s v.1lling to hear it. ·' . -
· Chief Justice Warren Burger ~ne of 
_ the six justices who voted to rehear the' · 
C.:SC (the other three· n~ted ~ strong -::·; ~- _ 
~ d1ssent), has been argumg smce his ::- -: ~ , · 
'.' :_ days as a federal judge that the exch.i- - ' . 
' ~- ' sionary rule needs to be mOdified ::.: •. ....i' -: 
7 •• M~y~ now if will be, perhaps aloni ;-_ r \ ' the lmes_ of l_:~slati?il proposed by the ( · 
- 1 ·· - __ agan adnim1stratJon-that evidence 
-I.: . · should be admitted if the officers who 
obtained it \\·ere acting in the "reason-
able and good-faith belief' that their 
actions were lawful ·· ' - · 
~. r~ coldly practical ~-rms, it probably -. 
, :- · won t r.nake much d1fference. Only a · 
handful of cases are thrown out as are- · 
-- suit of the exclusionary rule (though · 
.; p1at handful tend to be highly ·publi- _ 
-_, . ,_ C!Zed). Few criminals take the exclu-' . 
sionary rule into aecount when decid~-- _ 
ing whether -to com-mit a crime. And .. - -
-_ few officers would be tempted to in- .- , 
- duce coerced confessions as a result of · 
,_ . · common-sense modification of -the _ . ... 
I . . rule.-.~· •. - - .. _- . _--- .,.. . ._._ , _ 
! ~ [ The major· ~fect ~f 'modificatio~~ _-
! : - _ y.'O~d - be ~ the public P.erception of -
I JUStice-an liDportant consideration all · 
' by itself ' •··r ' - ' ' · · - · . . .• ... - .. ~ -, ~ -. .. . - . 
,, 
·- · r --.- -. --_-·-· ·-:-· · 
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Supplemental List 
I 
Motion of the SG for Leave 
to ~ile Reply Brief as 
Amicus Curiae 
SUMMARY: After the Court restored this case to the calendar 
for reargument, the SG filed an amicus brief. Resps and other 
amici filed briefs and directed many of their arguments to the 
SG's brief. The SG now moves for special leave to file a reply 
brief as amicus so that he might address those arguments. He 
recognizes that Rule 36.5 of this Court's Rules disallows such 
filings but contends that the importance of the Fourth Amendment 
issue presented and the United States' substantial interest 
warrant an exception. 
DISCUSSION: Rule 35.6 clearly states that "[n]o reply brief 
of an amicus curiae will be received." No exceptions are . . 
permitted within the Rule itself and the SG has presented none -to 
support the relief he requests. His position has already been 
set out in ·his amicus brief and if he wishes to address the 
arguments raised by the resps and other amici he may use his time 
at oral argument (as amici) to do so. 
The Court could of course, as the promulgator of its own 
rules, view this case and the offered brief as exceptional 
circumstances and grant the motion. However the precedential 
effect of such would counsel against that option. 
Should the Court view the SG's brief as worthy of 
consideration, it might simply decline to act on the motion and 
direct the Clerk to lodge the brief; it ~ould then be available 
for review. This latter option seems the more appropriate 
course. 
There is no response. 
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Question Presented 
Should the Court recognize a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in this case? 
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I. Background 
On October 13, the parties argued the question presented 
in the cert petn: Was the information provided by an anonymous 
tip, coupled with police corroboration of some of the innocent 
information, sufficient to provide probable cause for a search 
warrant? On November 29, the Court invited the parties to argue 
the additional possibility of a good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule, despite the fact that the Court had denied the 
State permission to argue this question originally. 
My bench memo in this case dated October 6, 1982, summa-
rizes the factual background and the decisions below. 
II. Discussion 
My previous bench memo in this case discusses the ques-
tion presented in the cert petn. In this bench memo I will only 
address the issue not previously discussed. 
A. Assumptions 
In addressing the good faith issue, I make two assump-
tions. First, I assume that the information provided by the 
anonymous tip in this case, when coupled with police corrobora-
tion of some of the innocent information, was sufficient to pro-
vide probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. For 
the reasons given in my prior bench memo, I continue to believe 
that this assumption is wrong. But you have been unconvinced by 
my earlier arguments, and I assume your position is now settled.~ 
Second, I assume that some good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule would be appropriate. In Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590 (1975), you wrote: 
[I)n some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the 
legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be jus-
tified by the rule's deterrent purposes .... 
All Fourth Amendment violations are, by constitution-
al definition, "unreasonable." There are, however, 
significant practical differences that distinguish 
among violations, differences that measurably assist in 
identifying the kinds of cases in which disqualifying 
the evidence is likely to serve the deterrent purposes 
of the exclusionary rule •... 
[There are] "technical" violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights where, for example, officers in good faith 
arrest an individual in reliance on a warrant later 
invalidated or pursuant to a statute that subsequently 
is declared unconstitutional .... As we noted in Mich-
igan v. Tucker [417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)]: "The deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily as-
sumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at 
the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right." In cases in which this 
underlying premise is lacking, the deterrence rationale 
of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I can see 
no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecu-
tion of reliable and probative evidence. 
Id., at 608-609, 611-612 (POWELL, J., concurring in part). This 
language certainly suggests that there should be an exception to 
the exclusionary rule, at least for technical violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 
n. 2 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("technical, trivial, or inadver-
tent violations") 
With these assumptions in mind, I see this reargument as 
presenting essentiall Do the facts of this case 
justify a good faith exception? And is this an appropriate case 
in which to announce a good faith exception? 
B. This Case as an Appropriate Vehicle 
I deal with the second question first. There are seri-
ous problems that counsel against using this case as the vehicle 
for creating the good faith except ion. These include problems 
that are discussed in the briefs and problems of which counsel 
cannot be aware. 
(1) Problems on the Public Record. The generally recog-
nized problems have been discussed in the various briefs, so I 
will highlight only two of them here. The first problem is the 
) 
fact that the State did argument until 
.February 8, 1982--more than a year after the Illinois Supreme 
r ---
Court rendered its final judgment in the case. 
r--- - ---state courts were never given the opportunity 
.. ~
Thus the Ill1no~
to pass on the pos-~ 
sibility of a good faith exception, even in a petn for rehearing. ~~Y 
If I were writing the pool memo in a federal case and 
petr sought review of an issue not raised below, I would point 
that fact out in my discussion and assume that nothing more need-
ed to be done. See, e.g., cert pool memo in No. 82-1214, at 3. 
' 
One of the Court's basic principles is that it will not review 
questions that were not raised below. 1) Since this case comes to 
< T~~~I2-Le-
1The principle is so well establishe__d it .should not require 
citation, but ample authority is cited jn the various briefs. 
the Court from a state supreme court, there are not only the ju-
risprudential problems with deciding a question not raised or 
considered below, but serious jurisdictional problems, as well.2 
If the Court really wants to use this case to decide the good 
faith issue, it should remand the case to the state courts to 
give them an opportunity to pass on the issue first. 
The second problem is perhaps an explanation for the 
first. Other than preserving the federal issue for review, the 
State probably would have accomplished nothing by raising the 
good faith issue in the state courts. Illinois has long had an 
exclusionary rule that exists entirely independently of its fed-----
er~. Thus there is an independent and adequate 
state ground for the exclusion-G-f illegally seized evidence. The 
~
creation of a good faith exeption in this case would be nothing 
more than an advisory opinion . 
..... ~.----.-·-----
~ 131-4.,1- ,,a, s/C"f ~ ~ ~rJI" ~Lc.tt-cL ~ 
"t;tzO, '-"-'S· sjc-1-. ~-~"'"~" _,., .. 4  
2There also seems to be a problem with the principles of fed-
eralism. Surely the Founders would not have intended the Supremy 
Court to reverse the judgment of ~ the highest court of a sovereign 
state on the basis of an issue that the state court never had the 
opportunity .to consider·. These pr i~iples were discussed by th 
Court as recently as last Term. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 
518 (1982) ("Because 'it would be unseemly in our dual system of 
government for a federal district court to upset a state court 
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct 
a constitutional violation,' federal courts apply the doctrine of 
comity, which 'teaches that one court should defer action on 
causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of an-
other sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant 
of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the mat-
ter.' Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). "). Here the 
concerns are even stronger. In Lundy, the federal issue was nec-
essarily dispositive, while here it is likely there was an inde-
pendent and adequate state ground. 
(2) Problems Not on the Public Record. Counsel (unaware 
of the Conference vote) have been unable to address the problems 
created by the fact that the judgment below will be reversed 
whatever happens on reargument. Assuming that the Court an-
nounces its decision on the merits, the creation of a good faith 
exception here will be mere dicta. ----- ---------~ The Court will be reaching 
out to decide an issue that is unnecessary to its judgment. It 
makes no difference to resps if the evidence is admitted against 
them because it was seized in compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment or because a good faith exception applies. 
On the other hand, it would be an abdication of respon-
sibility to reverse on the basis of a good faith exception with-
out reaching the merits. While it might be convenient for courts 
to use the exception to avoid facing difficult questions, such a 
practice (at least by appellate courts) would be particularly bad 
policy. To the extent the exception makes sense in a case such 
as this, it is only because the police were unable to know that 
their actions violated the Fourth Amendment. If courts simply 
' 
announce that, whether or not a violation took place, the excep-
~ ~ 
tion applies~ 3 police never will know how to conduct themselves 
~
3The SG encourages such decision-making (perhaps because it 
would inevitably lead to an erosion of Fourth Amendment rights). ~ ? 
His analogy with the harmless error doctrine, however, is unper-
suasive. When a court announces that a particular course of con-
duct was harmless, whether or not it was an error, it does not 
create the same problems, for good faith is not an issue. While 
prosecutors in a similar situation in a later case might not know 
if similar conduct will be error, this makes little difference to 
the resolution of the later case. Even if they know it to be 
error, it could still be harmless without regard to their knowl-
Footnote continued on next page. 
to avoid .Fourth Amendment violations in similar circumstances. 
If courts, however, announce that a violation took place, but 
that the good faith exception applies, then the evidence is 
available but future officers will (or should) know that similar 
conduct may not be repeated. Then the exclusionary rule can 
serve its deterrent purposes and the number of .Fourth Amendment 
violations will be reduced. 
C. The Good .Faith Exception on These .Facts 
It is highly artificial to speak of an exception to a 
rule that, on the merits, does not even apply. I suspect that 
one of the reasons that it seems unfair to apply the exclusionary 
rule here is your belief that the police and the judge who issued 
the warrant complied with the .Fourth Amendment. This is, of 
course, a good reason not to reach the good faith question. If 
the Court does reach the question, though, I assume it could hold 
that there was probable cause to support the warrant, but that 
even if there had not been • probable cause the pol ice acted in 
reasonable 4 good faith. 
edge. When police learn that certain conduct violates the .Fourth 
Amendment, however, they would be unable to claim a good faith 
exception. To avoid repeating old violations, therefore, it is 
necessary for the courts to announce what the violations are. 
4The most commonly proposed formulations of a good faith ex-
ception would require subjective as well as objective good faith. 
There is no record on the officers' subjective good faith here, 
but on the evidence available ' it is hard to imagine that the of-
ficers did not act in subjec tive good faith. ~ 
7 
/~~p~$ 
(1) The Probable Cause Standard. The Fourth Amendment 
violation that ~ably occurred here was the issuance of a 
search warran~n. less than probable cause. I see no way that 
such an error can be described as a "technical, trivial, or inad-
vertent" violation. Issuing a warrant on less than probable 
cause violates the plain language at the very heart of the Fourth 
Amendment: "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." 
As you recognized in Brown v. Illinois, there may be "technical" 
violations where officers in good faith arrest an individual in 
reliance on a warrant later invalidated. For example, the affi-
davit may be improperly authenticated, so that the constitutional 
"oath or affirmation" requirement is not satisfied. The issuing 
magistrate may fill out the form improperly, 5 perhaps even fail-
ing to sign the warrant. Assuming that the magistrate's inten-
tion is clear, such an error would be "technical." Or the magis-
trate may fail to comply with a strictly procedural rule. A 
state, for example, may require the supporting affidavit to be 
attached to the warrant for the warrant to be valid. If the war-
rant is otherwise valid (and the affidavit is otherwise in 
order) , failure to comply with this rule would be "technical," 
and the good faith exception would be appropriate. 
5 In one case I saw recently, the officer and the magistrate 
both used standard forms that referred to controlled substances--
despite the fact that their intention was a warrant to search for 
something else. Each amended the standard form to delete the 
references, but their editing was weak. As a result, there were 
technical violations. This is clearly a case where a good faith 
exception would be appropriate. 
There are, of course, a host of possibilities involving 
warrantless arrests, but again the error should be "technical." 
If the pol ice incorrectly believe that they have authority to 
search, but the belief is based on some specific good faith 
error, then the exception could apply. For example, they may be 
mistakenly advised by radio that a warrant has been issued, when 
in fact the warrant is not issued until after the search is corn-
pleted. Or they may conduct a search incident to arrest when the 
arrest is technically invalid. Or they may believe, on the basis 
of a good faith factual error, that they have probable cause and 
are not subject to the warrant requirement, but the belief would 
have been justified if their factual assumptions had been true. 
The exception is not appropriate, however, when the po-
lice, knowing the true facts, mistakenly believe that those facts 
~- ...........,___ "' 
are sufficient to constitute probable cause. All an exception -----would do in such circumstances is to lower the Fourth Amendment 
standard from "probable cause" to "what a reasonable police offi- / Ne 
cer believes is probable cause." In the grey area on the edge of_~ 
1  
probable cause, police will always make mistakes in both direc-~
l
tions, no matter where the line is drawn. But these are not rni~~ 
~ takes of fact that can be made in good faith. Rather, the
mistakes in judgrnen~ The existence of an exception to the ~ 
clusionary rule effectively removes the "incentive to err on the ~ 
' ~ . f .~
side of constitutional behavior," United States v. Johnson, ~ 
u.s. ___ , ___ , 102 s.ct. 2579, 2593 (1982), and provides an in- ~ 
centive to err in the opposite direction. ~· 
(2) Appellate Review of Magistrates' Decisions. There 
is a stong temptation to view this case too narrowly, and to look 
only at the behavior of the police who executed the warrant. As-
suming that they acted in subjective good faith, see note 4, 
supra, it is hard to fault them. I think they could easily have 
investigated their case in better detail, but having obtained 
enough evidence to satisfy a presumably impartial judicial offi-
cer, one can understand why they went no further. Thus there is 
a temptation to adopt the rule suggested by some of the amicii: 
the exclusionary rule will never apply when the police act pursu-
ant to a warrant, unless the warrant was, for example, based on 
perjury. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 u.s. 154 (1978). Such a 
rule, however, takes too narrow a view of the system. The exclu-
sionary rule deters not only the policeman who executes the war-
-~ 
rant, but everyone else in the criminal justice system. It en-
courages the investigating officers to investigate fully before 
seeking a warrant and to make their best case to the magistrate 
when they do seek a warrant, it encourages the police 
bureacracies to ensure that their officers observe the Fourth 
Amendment, it affects prosecutors working with investigators, and 
it encourages magistrates to apply the probable cause standard 
fairly. 
Adopting the per se rule suggested, however, has the 
effect of insulating virtually every warrant decision of a magis-
trate from appellate review. This lack of appellate review would 
be intolerable when one remembers that (i) proceedings before the 
magistrate are invariably ex parte, (ii) the magistrate is not 
necessarily a lawyer, (iii) the police generally can select the 
magistrate to whom the request for a warrant is directed, and 
(iv) if a magistrate declines to issue a warrant, the police may 
still seek a warrant from a second, third, or fourth magistrate. 
It is proper, of course, to give considerable deference to magis-
trate's decisions despite all of these problems. That is the 
best way to encourage police to at least go to a magistrate. 6 
But the possibilities for abuse are too great when there is no 
realistic avenue of appellate review. Although most magistrates 
undoubtedly act in good faith, it requires only one in a juris-
diction to seriously erode Fourth Amendment rights. 
D. Retroactivity 
Resps argue that if the Court does adopt a good faith 
exception in this case, the rule must be applied prospectively. 
Brief 60-66. Although it generally is true that sharp changes 
from earlier practice are not applied retroactively, resps' argu-
ment is silly here. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule 
is to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment, not to 
correct past violations. Since violations that have already oc-
curred cannot now be deterred, there is no reason not to apply 
the good faith exception to them. 
6Given your inclination to reverse, I would be happiest if 
the decision were based on the considerable deference that should 
be given to magistrate's decisions. 
III. Conclusion 
The Court should not reach the merits of the good faith 
exception issue here for a number of jurisprudential and juris-
dictional reasons. If it does reach the merits, the exception 
should not apply to the facts of this case. 
/ yv:_/' 
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